TWENTY  YEARS  OF  PERSIAN  OPIUM 


(1908-1928) 


A Study 

by 

Elizabeth  P.  MacCallum 


Prepared  Under  the  Direction  of  the  ' 
Opium  Research  Committee 
of  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

Eighteen  East  Forty-First  Street 
New  York  City 


‘Trinted 

(^Ttlarch,  1928 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Foreword,  by  Helen  Howell  Moorhead  4 

Persian  Opium  Policy  in  the  Pre-War  Period  5 

The  Hague  Conference,  1911-1912  8 

Post-War  Eflforts  to  Control  Domestic  Opium  11 

Persian  Opium  and  League  Control  17 

Statistics  of  Persian  Exports  20 

Persia  at  the  Second  Opium  Conference  24 

Persian  Export  Policy  Since  the  Geneva  Conference  27 

Conclusion  37 

ANNEXES: 

1.  Persian  Policy  of  Opium  Restriction  39 

H.  Chairman’s  Personal  Summary  of  Findings  of 

League  Commission  of  Enquiry  40 

HI.  Diminution  of  Opium  Cultivation  in  Persia  44 

IV.  Observations  of  the  Persian  Government  on  the 

Report  by  the  League  Commission  of  Enquiry  49 

V.  Opium  Exports  of  Persia  54 

MAPS: 

Map  1.  Sketch  map  of  Persia,  indicating  relative 

standing  of  provinces  in  production  of  opium  14 

Map  H.  Sketch  map  of  Persia  showing  itinerary  of 

League  Commission  of  Enquiry  29 


FOREWORD 


The  relation  of  Persia  to  the  general  problem  of  interna- 
tional control  of  opium  is  a very  important  one.  Persia 
is  one  of  the  few  countries  producing  raw  opium  which 
have  associated  themselves  continuously  with  efforts  to  improve 
the  opium  situation  by  international  action.  And  Persia  is 
the  only  country  where  an  international  body  has  made  a study 
of  the  economic  disarrangement  and  physical  difficulties  which 
might  be  expected  to  result  from  limitation  of  the  opium  crop. 
Accordingly,  Persia  may  be  regarded  as  furnishing  in  a certain 
sense  a test  case  in  determining  the  applicability  to  the  world’s 
present  narcotic  problem  of  what  has  become  known  as  the 
“American  plan” — the  proposal  to  limit  the  production  of  raw 
materials  to  the  medical  and  scientific  needs  of  the  world. 

The  Commission  of  Enquiry  sent  by  the  League  of  Nations 
to  conduct  a study  in  Persia  has  reported  that  there  are  many 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  applying  the  American  plan  in  that 
country.  But  it  has  also  reported  that  the  difficulties,  in  the 
case  of  Persia,  are  not  insurmountable,  granted  a willingness 
to  cooperate  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Government,  coupled 
with  a determination  to  move  steadily  forward  toward  achieve- 
ment of  the  desired  results. 

It  must  be  realized  at  the  same  time,  however,  that  the 
application  of  the  American  plan  to  other  countries  may  be 
attended  with  difficulties  of  a different  type  than  those  foreseen 
in  the  case  of  Persia,  and  that  similarly  they  may  reveal  certain 
opportunities  for  success  that  do  not  exist  in  Persia.  Thus, 
although  Persia  does  partake  to  a certain  degree  of  the  nature 
of  a test  case,  the  present  embarrassments  in  the  Persian  situa- 
tion cannot  be  invoked  as  a reason  for  abandoning  the  attempt 
to  apply  the  American  plan  in  other  countries.  But  it  must 
be  recognized  that  the  Persian  situation  does  make  one  fact 
very  clear — viz.,  that  the  American  plan  cannot  be  regarded  as 
a panacea  easily  applicable  to  all  producing  countries,  nor  as 
one  whose  results  will  be  uniformly  successful  in  every  part  of 
the  world. 


Helen  Howell  Moorhead 


TWENTY  YEARS  OF  PERSIAN  OPIUM 


PERSIAN  OPIUM  POLICY  IN  THE  PRE-WAR  PERIOD 


HEN  the  International  Opium  Commission  met  at  Shanghai  in 


W February,  1909,  to  take  what  has  been  characterized  as  the  first 
step  toward  a solution  of  the  opium  problem  by  international  action,^ 
Persia  was  one  of  the  thirteen  states  whose  representatives  participated  in 
the  discussions. 

The  majority  of  the  states  represented  on  the  Commission  were  powers 
which  enjoyed  authority  in  regulating  the  policies  of  administrations  in 
the  Far  Eastern  area,  where  opium  and  drug  control  were  coming  to 
be  recognized  as  matters  of  extreme  importance.  Persia  was  one  of  the 
few  participating  states  which  was  neither  a Far  Eastern  country  nor  had 
territorial  possessions  in  that  region.  Its  inclusion  in  the  list  of  invited 
states  was  based  on  the  consideration  that  not  only  opium-consuming 
countries  but  also  all  large  opium-producing  countries  must  be  encouraged 
to  participate  in  the  discussion  of  international  opium  control  if  the  latter 
were  to  be  put  on  an  effective  basis. ^ 

Up  to  the  date  when  the  International  Opium  Commission  convened  in 
Shanghai  the  Persian  Government  had  followed  a policy  of  laisser-faire 
in  the  matter  of  opium  production.  It  had  not  itself  attempted  to  mon- 
opolize cultivation  or  sale  of  the  drug  in  any  way,  nor  had  it  enacted  any 
laws  governing  the  consumption,  importation  or  exportation  of  opium.® 
It  did,  however,  derive  from  the  opium  trade  annual  revenues  estimated 
by  the  Persian  delegate,  M.  D.  Rizaeff,  to  be  roughly  in  the  neighborhood 
of  350,000  tomans.^  About  one-seventh  of  this  revenue  was  yielded  by 
provincial  taxes  on  production,  while  the  remaining  six-sevenths  repre- 
sented the  export  duties  collected  by  the  Imperial  Customs  Bureau.® 

In  the  absence  of  precise  statistics,  the  Persian  delegate  placed  the 
annual  opium  production  of  his  country  at  about  1,330,000  lbs.  and  stated 
that  of  this  amount  one-quarter  was  retained  for  domestic  consumption. 


(1)  Wright,  Dr.  Hamilton.  The  International  Opium  Commission.  (American  Journal 
of  Internationai  Law,  Voi.  HI  (1909).  p.  648.) 

(2)  Willoughby,  W.  W..  Opium  as  an  International  Problem, 

(3)  International  Opium  Commission,  Shanghai,  1909.  Vol.  II.  Memorandum  on  Opium 
Produced  in  Persia,  p.  317,  tt. 

(4)  For  purposes  of  general  calculation  the  toman  may  be  taken  as  the  equivalent 
of  the  American  dollar. 

(6)  International  Opium  Commission.  Shanghai,  1909.  Vol.  II.  Memorandum  on  Opium 
Produced  in  Persia. 


6 


The  total  value  of  exports  of  Persian  opium  he  estimated  to  be  about 
$3,000,000.  He  further  estimated  that  of  the  amount  exported  one- 
fifteenth  was  sent  to  the  continent  of  Europe  and  Africa,  four-fifteenths 
to  Great  Britain  and  the  remaining  two-thirds  to  Hongkong  and  the 
Straits  Settlements. 

The  Persian  delegate  in  explaining  the  large  amounts  of  Persian  opium 
consigned  to  Hongkong  and  the  Straits  Settlements  stated  that  the  ma- 
jority of  this  opium  (or  about  35  per  cent  of  Persia’s  total  annual  pro- 
duction) found  its  way  ultimately  to  Formosa,  while  less  than  one  third 
(or  15  per  cent  of  Persia’s  total  production)  was  re-exported  from  the 
Straits  Settlements  and  Hongkong  to  China.  He  added  that  no  opium 
was  exported  to  China  directly  from  Persia. 

The  Japanese  delegation  sharply  challenged  the  allegation  that  so  large 
a proportion  of  Persian  opium  was  consumed  in  Formosa,  and  produced 
figures  prepared  by  the  Government  of  Formosa  which  indicated  that 
the  average  importation  of  Persian  opium  during  the  years  1901-07,  in- 
clusive, had  been  only  one-quarter  of  the  amount  indicated  by  the  Persian 
delegation.®  No  one,  however,  challenged  the  accuracy  of  the  Persian 
statement  that  half  of  the  total  amount  of  opium  produced  in  Persia  was 
exported  annually  to  the  Far  East. 

The  outcome  of  the  Shanghai  deliberations  was  a series  of  nine  resolu- 
tions endorsed  by  all  the  delegations,  including  that  of  Persia.  Of  these 
resolutions  there  were  two  whose  implications  in  some  degree  affected 
Persia.  Resolution  2 recommended  that  each  delegation  should  move  its 
own  government  to  take  measures  for  the  gradual  suppression  of  the 
practice  of  opium  smoking.  Resolution  4 enjoined  on  each  country  the 
duty  of  adopting  all  reasonable  measures  to  prevent  at  ports  of  departure 
the  shipment  of  opium,  its  alkaloids,  derivatives,  or  preparations  to  any 
country  which  prohibited  their  entry. 

To  the  Persian  Government  the  foregoing  resolutions  represented  an 
entirely  unfamiliar  opium  policy.  Hitherto,  as  already  recorded,  there 
had  been  no  attempt  to  suppress  opium  smoking  nor  to  regulate  the  do- 
mestic use  of  opium.  Nor  had  there  been  any  attempt  to  prohibit  or 
control  the  shipment  of  opium  abroad.  Now  the  question  arose  as  to 
whether  the  Persian  Government  could  be  induced  to  change  its  policy. 
The  question  was  a critical  one  from  the  point  of  view  of  China,  since  the 
latter  was  endeavoring  to  shut  out  Persian  opium,  along  with  Turkish 
and  Indian  opium,  from  its  territory.  To  this  end  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment had  issued  a regulation,  effective  January  1,  1909,  whereby  the  im- 
portation of  Persian  and  Turkish  opium  was  to  be  annually  reduced  until 

(6)  In  Its  subsequent  report  to  Congress  the  American  delegation  avoided  all  reference 
to  the  disputed  question  of  Persian  opium  in  Formosa.  In  view  of  the  uncertainty  attached 
by  the  Persian  delegate  himself  to  the  figures  he  submitted,  the  American  report  paraphrased 
his  statement  in  the  following  more  general  terms:  “The  Persian  report  exhibited  the  fact 
that  there  is  a large  internal  production  of  low-grade  opium;  that  there  is  a large  con- 
sumption of  it  by  the  native  population,  and  that  a smaller  part  was  exported  to  China. 
A higher  grade  of  opium  for  medicinal  purposes  Is  also  produced  and  exported  to  Europe.” 
(Sixty-First  Congress,  Second  Session.  Senate  Document  S77.  Feb.  21,  1910.) 

6 


the  year  1916,  after  which  no  more  permits  for  such  importation  would 
be  issued  and  the  trade  in  Persian  and  Turkish  opium  would  be  com- 
pletely suspended.^ 

The  Persian  Government  was  not  slow  in  indicating  the  policy  it  would 
follow.  Upon  receipt  of  the  report  of  its  delegation  to  Shanghai  it  con- 
tinued to  disavow  responsibility  for  controlling  opium  exports  intended 
ultimately  for  the  China  trade.  But  it  did  initiate  measures  to  control 
the  domestic  use  of  the  commodity.  An  opium  law  consisting  of  six 
articles  was  adopted  by  the  Mejliss  late  in  1910.  It  provided  that  after 
seven  years  the  use  of  opium  should  be  confined  to  medicinal  purposes 
while  the  use  of  its  derivative,  shire^h  of  soukhteh,^  should  be  entirely 
stopped.  In  the  interval  taxes  imposed  upon  stick  opium  and  shireh  of 
soukhteh  would  be  gradually  increased.  All  residue  of  smoked  opium 
was  to  be  turned  over  to  agents  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  at  a fixed 
price.®  This  would  ensure  government  control  of  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  shireh  of  soukhteh,  which  should  not  exceed  the  amount  actually 
required  by  shireh  addicts  (whose  names  were  to  be  officially  registered) 
during  the  seven-year  period  preceding  the  date  when  all  soukhteh  was 
to  be  destroyed.^® 

The  Ministries  of  Finance  and  the  Interior  were  entrusted  with  the 
task  of  drafting  regulations  to  make  the  new  opium  law  effective.  Shireh 
dens  were  henceforward  to  be  under  Government  control.  All  opium 
sap  was  to  be  centralized  in  Government  warehouses  for  manipulation. 
Some  months  later,  to  ensure  payment  of  export  dues,  a system  of  stamp- 
ing opium  for  export  was  devised.^^ 

This  law  was  already  promulgated  when  in  1911  Mr.  M.  Shuster,  the 
newly-appointed  American  Administrator  General  of  Finance,  suggested 
a substantial  increase  in  opium  taxes  as  one  of  a series  of  measures  for 
enhancing  the  national  revenues.  Approved  by  the  Council  on  September 
30,  1911,  the  proposal  failed  to  become  effective  because  of  the  unex- 
pected withdrawal  of  Mr.  Shuster  from  Persia  before  the  bill  could  be 
submitted  to  the  Mejliss. 

Thus,  by  the  time  when  the  International  Opium  Conference  was  con- 
vened at  The  Hague  in  1911,  Persia  had  acquired  an  opium  policy  dis- 
tinctly different  from  the  one  which  had  been  in  vogue  when  the  Inter- 
national Opium  Commission  first  met  at  Shanghai  in  1909.  Without 
altering  its  export  policy  or  endangering  in  any  way  the  substantial  rev- 
enues derived  from  the  shipment  of  opium  abroad,  the  Persian  Govern- 

(7)  For  China’s  action  with  regard  to  restriction  of  Indian,  Turkish  and  Persian  opium, 
see  Dr.  Hamilton  Wright.  The  International  Opium  Commission.  (American  Journal  of 
International  Law,  Vol.  Ill  (1909.)  pp.  835,  842.) 

(8)  Shireh  of  soukhteh,  sometimes  referred  to  as  essence  of  opium,  was  the  most 
harmful  opium  derivative  in  common  use  in  Persia.  ’’Shireh”  was  regularly  manufactured 
from  the  opium  dross  or  residue  (known  as  soukhteh)  remaining  in  the  pipes  after  smoking. 

(9)  In  1914  an  amendment  to  the  opium  law  temporarily  reduced  this  redemption  prlca 
by  two-thirds.  Later,  to  combat  the  resultant  increase  in  smuggling  of  soukhteh,  tha  prlc» 
was  raised  again. 

(10)  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference.  Geneva,  November 
17th.  1924-February  19th,  192B.  Vol.  II.  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  p.  212. 

(11)  Ibid,  p.  195. 


7 


ment  had  taken  an  important  step  in  the  direction  of  suppressing  domestic 
consumption,  in  spite  of  the  difficulty  and  expense  which  enforcement 
was  recognized  to  involve. 

THE  HAGUE  CONFERENCE,  1911-1912 

The  first  International  Opium  Conference  at  The  Hague,  convened 
to  draft  an  international  agreement  embodying  the  principles  proposed 
at  Shanghai,  was  attended  by  a delegation  from  Persia  headed  by  Mirza 
Mahmoud  Khan.  The  latter  took  an  active  if  not  always  successful  part 
in  the  deliberations.  Two  proposals  were  suggested  by  him  which  the 
Conference  failed  to  accept.  The  first  of  these  was  a sweeping  reso- 
lution whose  acceptance  would  have  bound  all  of  the  Governments  repre- 
sented in  the  Conference  to  regard  as  contraband  and  to  destroy  immedi- 
ately all  opium  prepared  for  smoking  found  in  international  transit.  This 
resolution  was  defeated  by  unanimous  vote. 

A later  resolution  proposed  by  Mirza  Mahmoud  Khan,  aimed  at  the 
elimination  of  eating-opium  and  low-grade  smoking-opium,  had  the  sup- 
port of  the  United  States  delegation,  but  was  defeated  through  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  remaining  members  of  the  Conference.^^  The  resolution  was 
as  follows : 

“It  is  agreed  by  all  the  represented  Powers  that  there  should  be  a 
gradual  suppression  of  the  production  of  opium  containing  less  than  9 per 
cent  of  morphia,  and  that  the  interested  Powers  should  pledge  themselves  to 
discourage  all  enterprises  due  to  private  initiative  engaged  in  the  production 
of  a lower  grade  of  opium;  and  where  opium  is  produced  under  Government 
monopoly  or  where  the  system  of  Government  monopoly  is  to  be  established, 
they  should  engage  within  eight  years  to  raise  the  quality  of  such  opium 
to  the  recognized  standard.” 

This  attempt  to  limit  the  production  of  opium  to  the  higher  grades 
suitable  for  manufacture  of  drugs  for  medicinal  purposes  was  opposed 
with  special  vigor  by  one  of  the  British  delegates,  whose  chief  contention 
was  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  do  away  with  the  production  of  low- 
grade  opium  in  India  as  long  as  normal  medical  service  in  the  European 
sense  of  the  term  was  not  available  for  great  masses  of  the  population  of 
that  country. 

Mirza  Mahmoud  Khan’s  proposals  were  merely  incidents  in  a long 
and  busy  conference,  which  arrived  ultimately  at  a number  of  agreements 
embodied  in  the  so-called  Hague  Convention.  It  was  the  intent  of  the 
International  Opium  Convention  drawn  up  at  this  Conference  to  provide 
for  gradual  suppression  in  all  parts  of  the  world  of  the  abuse  of  opium, 
morphine,  cocaine  and  their  preparations  and  derivatives.  To  this  end 
it  suggested  common  policies  to  control  production,  manufacture  and 
trade  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  The  Convention  was  to  become  effective 
on  December  31,  1912.^* 

(12)  International  Opium  Conference,  The  Hague,  1911-12.  Actes  et  Documents.  1912. 

(13)  League  of  Nations.  Report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  In  Opium.  First 
Session.  Geneva,  May  2-5,  1921. 


8 


The  action  taken  by  Persia  with  respect  to  the  Hague  Convention 
was  an  index  to  the  policy  it  has  pursued  ever  since  the  1911-12  Con- 
ference. The  Persian  delegate  signed  the  Convention,  but,  in  keeping 
with  his  Government’s  former  refusal  to  interfere  with  shipments  of 
opium  destined  for  the  Far  Eastern  trade,  he  made  a reservation  with 
respect  to  clause  (a)  of  Article  3 which  provided  that  contracting  powers 
should  prevent  the  export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  prohibiting  its 
entry.^^ 

In  the  case  of  Persia,  which  hitherto  had  assumed  no  responsibility 
for  the  destination  of  opium  shipped  from  its  ports.  Article  3 (a)  of  the 
Hague  Convention  was  regarded  as  constituting  an  obligation  too  serious 
to  be  assumed  immediately.  The  Persian  delegate  offered  to  support  the 
clause  if  it  were  amended  to  read:  “To  prevent  as  soon  as  possible  the 
export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  which  shall  have  prohibited  its  entry 
but  when  his  proposal  was  voted  down  he  refused  to  endorse  the  clause 
as  it  stood  in  the  text  of  the  Convention. 

The  Persian  reservation  was  not  made  for  purely  academic  reasons. 
In  the  interval  since  the  Shanghai  Conference  of  1909,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, which  had  already  made  arrangements  with  Great  Britain  for 
the  reduction  of  Indian  opium  shipments  to  China,  had  further  decreed 
that  importation  of  Persian  and  Turkish  opium  into  China  should  cease 
on  January  1,  1912,  instead  of  in  1916  as  originally  contemplated.  (See 
above,  p.  6.)  For  the  Persian  Government  to  acquiesce  in  Article  3 (a) 
would  therefore  have  been  to  assume  moral  responsibility  for  seeing  that 
the  lucrative  trade  in  opium  with  China  was  terminated  immediately. 

The  Chinese  Government,  anticipating  difficulty  in  excluding  Persian 
as  well  as  Turkish  and  Indian  opium,  attempted  at  the  Hague  Conference 
to  obtain  the  adhesion  of  the  Governments  there  represented  to  the  terms, 
among  other  things,  of  its  embargo  on  Persian  opium  in  order  that  each 
Government  might  make  the  prohibition  binding  on  its  own  nationals. 
The  Persian  delegate,  while  affirming  his  belief  that  smoking-opium  must 
be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  dangerous  poisons — a poison  which  no 
civilized  nation  should  export  or  import — deprecated  the  Chinese  pro- 
posal to  incorporate  the  terms  of  the  embargo  in  the  Hague  Convention 
itself.  Since  the  embargo  went  into  effect  on  January  1,  Persian  mer- 
chants, caught  with  large  stocks  on  their  hands,  had  been  faced  with 
heavy  losses.  He  feared  that,  if  the  embargo  resolution  were  to  be  in- 
corporated in  the  text  of  the  Hague  Convention,  Persians  would  blame 
the  Conference  for  their  misfortunes.  For  the  Persian  Government,  which 

(14)  Article  8,  to  a clause  of  which  the  Persian  delegate  objected,  was  one  of  several 
articles  dealing  with  the  export  of  opium.  The  entire  article  was  as  follows: 

"Article  3. 

The  Contracting  Powers  shall  take  measures : 

(a)  To  prevent  the  export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  which  shall  have  prohibited  Its 
entry,  and 

(b)  To  control  the  export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  which  restrict  its  import,  unless 
regulations  on  the  subject  are  already  in  existence." 

9 


depended  on  the  cooperation  of  its  people,  it  was  important  that  so  seri- 
ous a misunderstanding  should  be  avoided,  if  the  authorities  were  to 
enjoy  the  support  of  public  opinion  in  enforcing  the  main  provisions  of 
the  Hague  Convention.  Over  the  Persian  protest,  however,  'the  majority 
of  the  delegates  agreed  to  the  Chinese  proposal  to  write  the  embargo  into 
the  text  of  the  Hague  Convention.  But  later  the  Chinese  delegation  of 
their  own  accord  withdrew  their  suggestion,  since  it  had  become  appar- 
ent that  if  it  remained  incorporated  in  the  text  of  the  main  instrument  it 
would  stand  in  the  way  of  unanimous  agreement  to  the  terms  of  the 
Hague  Convention. 

No  Persian  delegate  attended  the  Second  International  Opium  Con- 
ference held  at  The  Hague  in  July,  1913  to  secure  ratification  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1912,  but  at  the  Third  Conference  in  June,  1914,  Mirza  Mah- 
moud Khan  appeared,  promising  on  behalf  of  his  Government  that,  after 
certain  constitutional  details  had  been  attended  to,  Persia  would  ratify 
and  enforce  the  Hague  Convention  of  1912. 


10 


POST-WAR  EFFORTS  TO  CONTROL  DOMESTIC  OPIUM 


IF  the  Great  War  served  to  delay  international  measures  for  the  sup- 
pression of  opium  smoking  in  the  Far  East  in  general  and  in  Chinese 
foreign  concession  areas  in  particular,  it  had  also  the  result  of  dissipat- 
ing the  hopes  or  fears  of  those  Persians  who  had  foreseen  the  early  sup- 
pression of  opium  smoking  in  their  own  country.  For  Russian,  British 
and  Turkish  campaigns  in  Persia  resulted  in  an  almost  complete  paralysis 
of  the  central  government  at  Teheran.  The  country  was  over-run  with 
foreign  troops.  Russian  attacks  continued  until  1920,  and  a British  mili- 
tary occupation  until  1921.  The  internal  administration  of  the  country 
was  in  a state  of  disorganization.  The  Government  bureau  for  the  re- 
duction of  the  use  of  opium  and  its  derivatives,  formed  in  1910  to  enforce 
the  opium  law,^  had  long  since  disappeared.  Although  there  were  spor- 
adic attempts  to  collect  opium  taxes,  and  rates  of  taxation  were  nominally 
higher  than  formerly,  the  1910  opium  law  was  largely  in  abeyance.  Cer- 
tainly it  had  failed  in  its  avowed  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  the  use  of 
shireh  of  soukhteh  and  the  smoking  of  opium  before  the  year  1918. 

But  ultimately  the  tide  changed.  In  1921,  at  the  time  when  foreign 
troops  were  being  withdrawn  from  Persia,  forces  were  at  work  which 
made  for  the  strengthening  of  the  central  government,  and  with  the  grad- 
ual renewal  of  an  effective  central  administration  the  attempt  of  the  Gov- 
ernment to  establish  control  over  Persia’s  internal  opium  traffic  also 
revived. 

It  was  in  1922  that  the  Persian  Minister  of  War  (who  was  among  the 
men  chiefly  responsible  for  the  unexpected  regeneration  of  Persia’s  na- 
tional vigor)  assumed  responsibility  for  collecting  domestic  opium  rev- 
enues and  for  seeing  that  the  regulations  under  the  1910  law  for  centraliz- 
ing opium  sap  in  government  warehouses  were  carried  out.  In  this  it 
was  estimated  later^  that  he  succeeded  to  the  extent  of  bringing  one-fifth 
of  the  domestic  trade  under  government  control.  His  greatest  success 
was  obtained  in  the  provinces  of  Teheran,  Kermanshah,  Shahroud,  Ker- 
man, Hamadan  and  Yezd.^ 

In  1922  an  American  Financial  Mission  under  Dr.  A.  C.  Millspaugh 
undertook  responsibility  for  reorganizing  the  finances  of  Persia.  Col- 
lection of  opium  revenues  was  therefore  transferred  to  it  by  the  Minister 
of  War,  and  one  of  the  many  duties  of  the  American  Mission  was  in  con- 
sequence found  to  consist  in  extending  and  enforcing  the  government’s 
regulations  for  control  of  the  domestic  opium  trade. 

(1)  International  Opium  Conference.  The  Hague,  1911-12.  Actes  et  Documents.  1912. 

(2)  Millspaugh,  A.  C..  The  American  Task  in  Persia. 

(3)  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference.  Geneva,  Nov.  17 
1924-Feb.  19.  1925.  Vol.  II.  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  p.  19S. 

11 


The  smuggling  of  opium  from  producing  areas  for  consumption  in 
non-producing  areas  within  Persia  had  by  this  time  become  a highly  or- 
ganized business.^  Within  producing  areas  themselves  irregular  transac- 
tions were  also  frequent.  Thus,  to  enforce  the  regulation  that  all  opium 
sap  must  be  centralized  in  government  warehouses  was  to  combat  power- 
ful vested  interests,  especially  in  Isfahan,  where  even  the  Minister  of  War 
had  been  unsuccessful  in  his  attempts  to  make  producers,  owners  and 
traders  conform  with  the  laws. 

Faced  everywhere  with  difficulties,  it  was  in  this  city  that  the  American 
Financial  Mission  met  the  most  determined  opposition.  It  was  estimated 
that  in  Isfahan  at  least  5,000  out  of  a total  population  of  80,000  gained 
their  whole  living  or  a substantial  part  of  it  from  the  opium  trade.^ 
Isfahan  was  the  center  where  almost  all  raw  opium  intended  for  export 
was  manipulated.  It  had  hitherto  intimidated  all  Government  agents 
sent  to  enforce  the  1910  laws.  In  1923,  when  the  American  Financial 
Mission  in  its  turn  undertook  to  establish  a central  warehouse  in  that 
city,  a crisis  arose.  Recalcitrant  opium  traders  occupied  the  premises  of 
the  Telegraph  Office  in  protest  against  enforcement  of  the  opium  law  and 
induced  7,000  peasants  from  the  surrounding  countryside  to  enter  Is- 
fahan and  join  in  the  protest.  The  city  bazaars  closed,  and  a general 
strike  began.  Col.  D.  W.  MacCormack  was  despatched  to  Isfahan  on 
behalf  of  the  American  Financial  Mission  to  enforce  the  regulations.  In 
less  than  three  weeks,  according  to  the  report  of  the  Administrator  Gen- 
eral of  the  Finances  of  Persia,  he  succeeded  in  arriving  at  an  agreement 
with  the  peasants  and  established  a working  compromise  with  the  mer- 
chants whereby  a measure  of  government  supervision  was  at  last  put  into 
effect,  and  the  complaints  of  Isfahan  traders  were  terminated. 

Some  realization  of  the  practical  problems  continually  faced  by  the 
American  Financial  Mission  is  gained  by  a perusal  of  the  quarterly  re- 
ports of  the  Administrator  General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia  during 
the  period  when  control  was  being  established  over  the  opium  trade. 

The  essential  object  was  to  gather  all  opium  sap  into  the  government 
warehouses,  since  only  in  this  way  could  the  Administration  be  sure  of 
collecting  legitimate  revenues  derived  from  local  consumption  and  ex- 
portation and  from  handling  opium  in  the  mails.  Formerly  opium  taxes 
had  been  farmed  out  or  collected  by  provincial  governors  and  tribal 
chiefs.®  The  system  had  encouraged  corruption.  Centralization,  although 
more  expensive,  was  considered  preferable  in  every  way.  Soon  the 
American  Mission  reported  that  very  satisfactory  progress  had  been  made 
in  centralizing  opium  sap,’'  especially  in  Isfahan,  where  general  exemp- 
tions granted  the  previous  year  were  withdrawn  and  the  amounts  of  opium 

(4)  Mlllspaugli,  A.  C.,  The  American  Task  in  Persia. 

(6)  Ibid. 

(6)  Ibid. 

(7)  Administrator-General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia.  Eighth  Quarterly  Report  (Juns- 
September,  1924). 


12 


sap  entering  the  warehouse  had  more  than  doubled  in  comparison  with 
those  of  the  previous  year.  The  amount  of  opium  sap  entered  in  gov- 
ernment warehouses  was  much  greater  now  than  it  had  been  under  previ- 
ous more  troubled  administrations,  rising  from  477,659  lbs.  in  the  year 
1918-19  to  1,156,083  in  the  year  1922-23  and  1,372,650  in  the  year 
1923-24.  But  much  still  remained  to  be  done  in  certain  of  the  provinces. 
Shiraz,  for  example,  was  just  beginning  to  come  under  control.  Here, 
as  had  been  the  case  in  Isfahan,  the  administration  was  forced  at  first  to 
make  concessions  to  the  merchants,  who  continued  to  use  private  fac- 
tories to  a certain  extent  for  the  manipulation  of  opium,  but  who  agreed 
to  meet  certain  fixed  charges  in  return  for  this  privilege  and  to  pay  stated 
transit  dues  on  opium  shipped  to  domestic  markets  or  to  the  port  of 
Bushire. 

In  1923,  early  in  the  process  of  centralization,  steps  were  taken  to 
prevent  losses,  deficits  and  frauds  said  to  have  been  occurring  in  the 
central  warehouses.  Strict  methods  of  accounting  were  introduced  and 
no  consignment  of  opium  was  accepted  until  after  careful  examination 
for  counterfeit  banderoles.*  Weight  and  quantity  were  individually  re- 
corded. 

In  the  same  year,  for  the  purpose  of  extending  control  over  the  sale 
of  opium  dross  (soukhteh)  an  appropriation  of  20,000  tomans  (approxi- 
mately $20,000)  was  made.  This  enabled  wider  purchase  of  dross  from 
which  government  agents  might  manufacture  the  amounts  of  shireh  re- 
quired by  addicts  presumed  to  have  been  registered  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  1910  opium  law.  Special  instructions  were  issued 
for  the  preparation,  collection  and  transport  of  soukhteh,  but  it  was  only 
gradually  that  the  government  regulations  were  made  effective. 

The  war  on  domestic  smuggling  of  opium  continued  throughout  the 
entire  period  of  the  American  financial  administration.  Illicit  transac- 
tions were  relatively  easy  to  detect  in  those  provinces  where  opium  was 
not  produced,  and  in  such  regions  the  Administration  claimed  to  have 
established  fairly  effective  control.  (See  Map  1.)  It  was  in  the  prov- 
inces where  opium  was  produced  and  where  clandestine  transportation 
was  a highly  organized  business  that  smuggling  was  most  difficult  to 
suppress. 

A system  of  transportation  permits  was  devised,  whereby  the  progress 
of  opium  consignments  could  be  closely  watched  between  place  of  origin 
and  destination.  Banderoles  were  surcharged  with  the  name  of  the  dis- 
trict for  which  each  package  was  destined.  An  attempt  was  made  to  im- 
prove postal  facilities  for  the  handling  of  opium,  so  that  the  regulation 
might  be  enforced  which  prohibited  transportation  by  caravan  unless 
taxes  had  first  been  paid  in  cash  as  security.  Weekly  telegraphic  reports 

(8)  Banderolea  were  affixed  to  prepared  opium  by  agents  of  the  government  to  Indicate 
that  regulations  had  been  complied  with  and  legal  dues  paid. 

13 


of  opium  prices  in  the  provinces  were  sent  to  Teheran,  enabling  the  Ad- 
ministration to  detect  cases  in  which  a substantial  amount  of  smuggling 
was  having  the  effect  of  lowering  general  prices. 


Sketch  Map  of  Persia 

(Indicating  relative  standing  of  provinees  in  production  of  opium) 


It  was  found  necessary,  too,  to  request  the  Prime  Minister  to  issue  an 
order  providing  for  the  dismissal  of  any  Government  employee  found 
to  be  engaged  in  the  illicit  opium  traffic.  This  order  was  issued  early  in 
1924_8a  Later  a Civil  Service  Law  provided  that  government  employees 
who  failed  within  a specified  time  to  abandon  the  opium  habit  should  be 
discharged.  Opium  smoking  was  forbidden  in  the  army  also. 

In  a Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium  submitted  by  the  Persian  Delega- 
tion to  the  Second  Opium  Conference  held  at  Geneva  (November,  1924- 
February,  1925),  there  were  outlined  a series  of  seven  principles  for 
opium  control  which  the  Persian  Government  assured  the  League  it  would 
immediately  adopt.  These  important  principles,  which  had  the  approval 


(8a)  Administrator-General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia.  Sixth  Quarterly  Report  (Decem- 
ber, 1923-March,  1924). 

14 


of  the  American  Financial  Mission,  are  reproduced  in  their  original  form 
in  Annex  I of  this  report.  (See  page  39.) 

The  net  result  of  the  Government’s  measures  to  establish  control  over 
the  Persian  opium  traffic  was  a gradual,  but  generally  not  spectacular, 
increase  in  opium  revenues.  The  following  figures  culled  from  the  re- 
ports of  the  Administrator  General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia  indicate 
the  progress  made.  It  will  be  remembered  that  weather  conditions  as 
well  as  the  effectiveness  of  the  work  of  government  inspectors  contributed 
in  an  important  way  to  the  results  quoted,  as  in  1925,  for  example,  when 
severe  weather  materially  diminished  the  opium  crop. 


Approximate 

Collection  of  Opium  Revenue 
Financial  Administration* 

{In  Krans) 

UNDER  American 

Lowest  Figure 

Highest  Figure 

Quoted 

Quoted 

1922-23 

11,860,765 

1923-24 

10,419,222 

12,064,531 

1924-25 

14,222,472 

14,899,611 

1925-26 

14,779,866 

16,391,084 

1926-27 

13,700,000t 

14,655,293 

1927-28 

14,000,000t 

•Since  revenues  are  variously  reported  in  different  tables,  the  highest  and  lowest  quota- 
tions are  reproduced  here  to  indicate  the  approximate  yield.  To  ascertain  corresponding  value 
in  American  dollars  divide  by  10. 
tEarly  estimates. 

The  above  collections  represented  financial  returns  from  the  following 
sources,  arranged  in  order  of  their  revenue-producing  value.® 

1.  A tax  on  smoking-opium  for  which  the  banderole  or  revenue  stamp 
served  as  a receipt. 

2.  An  agricultural  tithe  charged  against  the  proprietor’s  share  of  the 
opium  crop. 

3.  Import  and  export  dues. 

4.  Domestic  transport  charges. 

5.  Sale  of  shireh  of  soukhteh. 

6.  Fines  for  offenses  against  the  opium  regulations. 

7.  Warehouse  charges. 

8.  Manipulation  fees. 

While  the  reports  of  the  American  Financial  Mission  expressed  opti- 
mism with  regard  to  the  effectiveness  of  measures  taken  to  control  the 
opium  traffic,  it  was  frankly  recognized  that  the  situation  left  much  to  be 
desired.  There  continued  to  be  a certain  amount  of  smuggling  across 
the  Russian  border  in  both  directions.  Poppy-growing  districts  were 
widely  scattered  and  therefore  difficult  to  inspect.  In  the  gardens  of 

(9)  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference,  Geneva,  November 
17.  1924-February  19,  1925.  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  p.  212. 

15 


anderuns  (women’s  quarters)  where  inspections  could  seldom  be  carried 
out,  it  was  not  unusual  for  opium  to  be  grown.  Cultivators  were  apt  to 
retain  as  much  opium  as  they  desired  for  their  own  use.  Opposition  by 
cultivators  and  proprietors  had  been  so  stubborn  that  there  were  still 
some  excellent  opium-producing  areas  where  government  supervision  had 
not  been  established.  It  was  estimated  that  in  1923-24  one-third  of  the  total 
opium  production  of  Persia  escaped  government  supervision  by  one  or 
other  of  these  means. Even  in  1927  it  was  still  possible  for  a member 
of  the  American  Financial  Mission  to  admit  that,  whereas  at  some  points 
(e.  g.  in  Teheran)  the  law  was  well  enforced,  there  were  several  important 
opium-producing  and  marketing  centers  where  control  was  not  effective, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  in  these  places  the  government  had  found  it  neces- 
sary or  expedient  to  relax  the  rigor  of  the  enforcement  law.^^  In  ex- 
plaining this  phenomenon  the  Director  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Admin- 
istration recalled  the  fact  that  Persia  had  had  a constitutional  form  of 
government  for  only  twenty  years.  There  had  not  yet  been  time  to  build 
up  an  adequate  body  of  civil  and  criminal  law  or  even  to  provide  means 
for  the  execution  of  the  existing  laws  and  regulations.  There  was  an 
intense  public  feeling  against  any  legislation  or  regulation  which  infringed 
upon  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  individual.^^ 

The  impression  produced  by  the  published  statements  of  the  Director 
of  Internal  Revenue  Administration  is  one  of  considerable  gratification 
that  in  the  face  of  political,  geographical  and  psychological  difficulties  the 
American  Mission  had  succeeded  as  far  as  it  had  in  extending  control 
over  Persia’s  domestic  opium  trade.  It  estimated  that  control  had  been 
only  twenty  per  cent  effective  when  the  American  Mission  took  over  re- 
sponsibility for  opium  collection.  Within  three  years,  at  a cost  which 
the  Director  of  Internal  Revenue  Administration  placed  at  one-tenth  of 
the  opium  revenue,  it  was  again  estimated  that  control  had  become  almost 
seventy  per  cent  effective.  Up  to  the  time  when  the  American  Mission 
withdrew  in  1927,  however,  the  Administration  did  not  relax  its  efforts 
to  reach  the  goal  of  completely  effective  control. 


(10)  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference,  Geneva,,  Nov.  17, 
1924-Feb.  19,  1925.  Vol.  II.  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  p.  204. 

(11)  League  of  Nations.  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Production  of  Opium  in  Persia. 
Report  to  the  Council,  p.  41.  Also  Observations  of  the  Persian  Government  on  the  foregoing. 

(12)  League  of  Nations.  Observations  of  the  Persian  Government  on  the  Report  by  the 
Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Production  of  Opium  in  Persia^  p.  11. 

16 


PERSIAN  OPIUM  AND  LEAGUE  CONTROL 


IN  November,  1919,  Persia  responded  to  an  invitation  to  adhere  to 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  When  it  did  so  it  found 
itself  once  more  within  the  orbit  of  international  discussions  concern- 
ing world  opium  traffic,  for  by  Article  XXIII  of  the  League  Cov- 
enant and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  general  supervision  over  the  execution 
of  agreements  with  regard  to  the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dangerous 
drugs  had  been  entrusted  by  signatory  states  to  the  League  of  Nations. 

Persia,  because  of  its  failure  to  ratify  the  Hague  Convention,  was 
not  represented  on  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium  and 
other  Dangerous  Drugs,  which  met  for  the  first  time  in  1921  to  per- 
form its  function  of  encouraging  international  cooperation  and 
advising  the  League  Council  in  matters  affecting  the  drug  traffic.  But 
it  had  a representative  on  the  Fifth  Committee  of  the  League  As- 
sembly— a body  whose  duties  included  that  of  advising  the  Assembly 
concerning  the  traffic  in  opium.  Persia  thus  possessed  a double 
opportunity  for  engaging  in  discussions  of  international  measures  to 
eliminate  abuse  of  opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs.  Either 
in  the  Fifth  Committee  or  on  the  floor  of  the  Assembly 
itself  Persian  representatives  had  the  right  to  speak  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  exercise  to  the  full  such  influence  as  they  enjoyed  among 
their  colleagues.  From  them,  also,  the  Persian  Government  was  in 
position  to  receive  first-hand  accounts  of  yearly  trends  in  the  opium 
policy  of  the  League. 

It  was  soon  to  transpire  that  Persian  opium  policy  became  a 
familiar  topic  of  discussion  at  the  Palais  des  Nations  in  Geneva. 
During  precisely  the  same  period  when  the  American  Financial  Mis- 
sion in  Teheran  was  extending  administrative  control  over  the  pro- 
duction, manipulation  and  domestic  sale  of  Persian  opium,  there  was 
observable  at  Geneva  a growing  concern  lest  Persia’s  export  policy 
should  nullify  the  attempts  of  the  League  to  reduce  world  opium 
traffic  to  legitimate  proportions.  This  concern  was  to  reach  such  a 
degree  that  by  the  time  the  American  Mission  withdrew  from  Persia 
in  1927  that  country’s  export  policy  had  become  one  of  the  dominant 
themes  at  meetings  of  the  Opium  Advisory  Committee  in  Geneva. 

Those  who  advanced  objections  to  Persia’s  opium  export  policies 
did  so  chiefly  because  the  latter  remained  in  1921  substantially  what 
they  had  been  in  1911,  regardless  of  important  Changes  in  the  policies 
of  other  states.  The  Persian  authorities  assumed  no  more  responsibili- 

17 


ty  for  control  over  opium  exports^  than  was  necessary  for  collecting 
opium  export  fees  and  export  taxes.  With  the  destination  of  ship- 
ments they  did  not  concern  themselves.  There  seemed  to  be  no  indi- 
cation in  1921  that  Persia  might  soon  become  inclined  to  withdraw 
its  reservation  to  Article  3 (a)  of  the  Hague  Convention,  designed 
to  prevent  the  export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  which  prohibited  its 
entry.  (See  p.  9.) 

League  bodies  regretted  the  attitude  of  Persia  and  supported  the 
interests  of  countries  which  attempted  to  eliminate  importation  of 
foreign  opium.  The  Council  itself,  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium,  encouraged  all  states  party 
to  the  Convention  to  follow  the  lead  of  those  countries  which  had 
already  reduced  or  put  an  end  to  uncontrolled  opium  and  drug  exports. 

It  was  with  the  intention  of  providing  more  effective  machinery 
for  controlling  the  international  opium  trade  that  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Traffic  in  Opium  during  its  first  session  in  1921  worked 
on  a formula  to  ensure  the  legitimate  entry  of  exported  opium  into 
importing  countries.^  And  it  was  because  of  the  importance  of  sec- 
uring conformity  in  this  respect  among  all  opium  producing  and  drug 
manufacturing  countries  that  almost  no  year  was  to  pass  henceforward 
without  some  communication  from  the  League  Council  to  the  Persian 
Government,  urging  the  latter  to  ratify  the  Hague  Convention  and 
accept  responsibility  for  exercising  control  over  the  destination  of 
opium  and  drug  shipments. 

At  the  1921  session  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium 
the  specific  question  of  Persia’s  export  policy  did  not  arise.  But 
the  Committee  busied  itself  with  certain  matters  which  should  not 
go  unnoticed,  since  they  were  to  recur  again  and  again  on  subsequent 
occasions  when  Persia’s  position  in  the  international  opium  trade  was 
under  discussion. 

Among  other  things,  the  Committee  made  plans  for  collecting  an- 
nually from  all  states  party  to  the  Hague  Convention  information 
concerning  production,  distribution,  and  consumption  of  opium  and 
concerning  measures  adopted  to  put  the  provisions  of  the  Hague 
Convention  into  effect.  It  also  formulated  the  import  certificate 
system  already  alluded  to.  Finally  it  requested  the  League  of  Nations 
to  use  its  influence  to  secure  ratification  of  the  Hague  Convention 
by  all  member  states  as  soon  as  possible. 

(1)  It  did  forbid,  however,  the  export  of  morphine,  cocaine  and  their  derivatives,  except 
when  special  permission  had  been  received  from  the  Persian  government. 

(2)  The  Resolution  concerned  was  subsequently  adopted  by  both  the  League  Council  and 
the  Assembly.  It  read  as  follows: 

‘'Every  application  for  the  export  to  an  importer  of  a supply  of  any  of  the  substances 
to  which  the  Convention  applies  shall  be  accompanied  by  a certificate  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  importing  country  that  the  shipment  of  the  consignment  in  question  is  ap- 
proved by  that  Government  and  is  required  for  legitimate  purposes.  In  the  ease  of 
drugs  to  which  Chapter  III  of  the  Convention  applies,  the  certificate  shall  state  specifically 
that  they  are  required  solely  for  medicinal  or  scientific  purposes.” 

18 


Each  of  these  recommendations  the  Advisory  Committee  wished 
Persia  to  adopt.  Each  of  them,  if  adopted,  would  have  represented 
a departure  from  Persia’s  traditional  habits.  But  it  was  not  until 
the  second  session  of  the  Advisory  Committee  in  the  spring  of  1922 
that  their  bearing  on  Persian  policy  as  such  came  up  for  discussion 
at  Geneva.  On  this  occasion,  in  view  of  the  amounts  of  Persian 
opium  that  were  known  to  be  finding  their  way  to  Far  Eastern  ports, 
the  Advisory  Committee  asked  the  Council  to  urge  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment specifically  to  adhere  to  the  Hague  Convention  in  its  entirety 
and  to  put  its  provisions  into  force  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

From  this  time  forward,  discussions  of  Persia’s  export  policy  were 
destined  to  grow  in  length  and  liveliness  as  time  passed  and  as  re- 
peated efforts  to  induce  Persia  to  ratify  the  Hague  Convention  and 
put  its  provisions  into  effect  failed  to  secure  the  practical  results 
desired. 

The  discrepancies  between  the  suggestions  of  the  League  and  the 
accomplishments  of  Persia  were  not  due  to  negligence  on  the  part 
of  Persian  representatives  in  submitting  the  League’s  views  to  their 
own  Government.  The  Persian  delegate  to  the  Third  Assembly, 
for  example,  telegraphed  to  his  Government  in  September,  1922,  re- 
questing it  to  ratify  the  Hague  Convention  and  withdraw  its  reser- 
vation to  Article  3 (a).  The  reply  of  the  Persian  Government  was 
received  when  the  Advisory  Committee  met  for  the  fourth  time  in 
January,  1923.  The  Persian  Government,  this  reply  stated,  proposed 
to  submit  the  question  of  unqualified  ratification  to  the  Mejliss  at 
an  early  date.  To  reconsider  the  entire  question  of  Persian  opium 
policy  before  the  nation  committed  itself  to  ratification  of  the  Hague 
Convention,  a committee  appointed  by  the  Persian  Government  soon 
began  to  hold  sessions  in  Teheran.  When  the  Fifth  Session  of  the 
Advisory  Committee  met  (May-June,  1923)  it  was  expected  that  the 
report  of  the  Opium  Committee  in  Teheran  would  shortly  be  laid 
before  the  Mejliss. 

It  was  not  until  the  fall  of  1923,  however,  that  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment authorized  its  representative  at  Geneva  formally  to  announce 
the  conclusions  to  which  it  had  come.  Prince  Arfa-ed-Dowleh  stated 
before  the  Fifth  Committee  of  the  Assembly  (September,  1923)  that 
his  Government  was  now  ready  to  withdraw  its  reservation  in  regard 
to  Article  3 of  the  Treaty  of  1912. But  it  could  not  actually  take 
this  action  until  it  was  in  possession  of  a satisfactory  constructive 
scheme  providing  substitutes  for  the  cultivation  of  opium.  As  soon 
as  this  happened,  Persia  would  endorse  Article  3 on  the  understand- 
ing that  the  country  would  be  allowed  a certain  period  of  time  in 
which  to  put  the  substitution  program  into  practice. 

(2a)  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Fourth  Assembly.  Minutes  of  the  Fifth  Com- 
mittee, p.  131. 


19 


In  this  connection  Prince  Arfa  suggested  to  the  Assembly  that  it 
might  be  useful  to  send  a detailed  questionnaire  to  various  producing 
and  manufacturing  countries  to  ascertain  their  financial  and  technical 
difficulties  and  to  get  estimates  of  the  periods  of  time  which  it  would 
take  to  make  the  changes  desired.  An  Economic  Conference  might 
be  called  to  consider  the  replies  received. 

The  suggestion  was  not  carried  out  in  the  form  proposed,  but 
Prince  Arfa’s  main  view  that  opium  suppression  must  be  accompanied 
by  a carefully  planned  program  of  crop  substitution  was  not  con- 
tested. Meanwhile  the  Assembly  made  a laconic  response  to  the 
Persian  delegate’s  announcement  that  his  country  was  ready  in  prin- 
ciple and  conditionally  to  withdraw  its  reservation  to  Article  3 (a) 
of  the  Hague  Convention.  It  adopted  a resolution  asking  the  League 
Council  to  repeat  its  request  to  Persia,  along  with  seven  other  tardy 
member  states,  to  ratify  and  apply  the  opium  convention. 

STATISTICS  OF  PERSIAN  EXPORTS 

By  this  time  the  Advisory  Committee  had  begun  at  its  various 
meetings  to  discuss  in  some  detail  the  volume  and  destination  of 
Persia’s  opium  exports.  But  the  subject  had  its  difficulties.  Nothing 
was  clearer  than  that  authoritative  information  was  impossible  to  get 
under  existing  circumstances.  Persia  had  not  sent  annual  reports  to 
Geneva.  In  the  absence  of  official  statistics  the  best  that  could  be 
done  was  to  piece  together  information  published  in  the  records  of 
importing  countries.  But  general  statements  so  arrived  at  concerning 
the  Persian  export  trade  were  known  to  be  incomplete,  and  there 
was  a feeling  that  their  accuracy  could  not  be  depended  upon. 

Nevertheless,  such  figures  were  from  time  to  time  compiled  and 
published.  Among  the  first  given  to  the  public  through  the  medium 
of  the  Advisory  Committee  was  an  estimate  that  in  the  five  years  from 
1914  to  1919  Persia  had  exported  to  the  United  States  and  to  the  United 
Kingdom  a total  of  3,294,988  lbs.  of  opium,  while  to  the  Far  East  in  the 
nine  years  from  1911  to  1920  there  had  gone  consignments  (transhipped 
at  Bombay)  amounting  to  1,832,600  Ibs.^ 

At  a later  session  it  was  reported  that  the  Administrator  General 
of  the  Finances  of  Persia  had  placed  the  figure  of  Persian  opium 
exports  for  the  year  1921  at  362,885  lbs.,  the  destinations  named  being 
as  follows:  For  England,  272,644  lbs.,  for  Russia,  32,826  lbs.,  for 
Japan,  23,573  lbs.,  for  China,  12,642  lbs.,  for  India,  11,027  lbs.,  for 
Mesopotamia,  8,651  lbs.,  for  Egypt,  1,570  lbs.,  for  Switzerland,  1 lb., 
for  the  U.  S.  A.,  1 Ib."^ 

(3)  League  of  Nations.  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Minutes  of  the 
Fourth  Session,  January  8-14,  1923.  Annex  I. 

(4)  League  of  Nations.  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Minutes  of  the  Fifth 
Session,  May  24-Jttne  7,  1923. 


20 


Fragments  of  information  such  as  the  foregoing  were  welcomed 
by  the  Advisory  Committee,  even  though  they  lacked  qualities  which 
would  have  made  them  valuable  for  comparative  purposes.  For  since 
the  Hague  Convention  had  come  partially  into  force  the  Advisory 
Committee  was  on  the  alert  for  any  item  of  news  which  would  help 
to  indicate  trends  in  world  opium  traffic  and  an  opinion  existed  among 
members  of  the  Advisory  Committee  that  a particularly  dangerous 
trend  was  to  be  found  in  the  movement  of  large  quantities  of  Persian 
opium  to  the  Far  East.  At  the  third  session  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee (September  1,  1922)  the  view  had  been  stated  by  Mr.  (later  Sir) 
John  Campbell,  representing  India,  that  exports  from  India  to 
Formosa  had  been  almost  entirely  replaced  within  the  last  two  years 
by  exports  of  Turkish  and  Persian  opium.  Sir  Malcolm  Delevigne, 
the  Chairman,  had  added  that  since  states  party  to  the  Hague  Con- 
vention had  reduced  their  exports  to  the  Far  East  in  general,  a very 
serious  situation  had  been  arising  through  the  increase  of  exports  of 
Turkish  and  Persian  opium  to  this  area.  This  was  an  opinion  which 
later  figures  were  to  support  more  strikingly  than  those  already 
quoted. 

The  first  connected  and  full  report  on  Persian  opium  exports  which 
the  League  was  able  to  publish  was  contained  in  a memorandum  on 
Persian  opium  submitted  by  the  Persian  Government  to  the  Second 
Opium  Conference  in  November,  1924.  In  an  appendix  to  this  Mem- 
orandum the  subject  of  destination  of  Persian  opium  shipments  was 
given  more  extended  treatment  than  hitherto.  The  most  noteworthy 
feature  of  the  tables  prepared  on  this  subject  was  the  indication  that 
whereas  Russia  had  been  the  declared  destination  for  only  143,312  lbs. 
of  Persian  opium  in  1922-23,  in  the  following  year  it  had  been  the 
declared  destination  for  451,276  lbs.  The  amounts  consigned  to 
England  had  dropped  from  290,141  lbs.  in  the  earlier  year  to  9,802  in 
1923-24,  while  there  had  been  only  a slight  reduction  in  shipments  for 
China  (166,725  lbs.  in  1922-23  to  137,189  lbs.  in  1923-24). 

These  figures  are  of  particular  interest  in  the  light  of  statements 
which  were  to  emanate  in  succeeding  years  from  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee to  the  effect  that  very  little  of  the  Persian  opium  consigned 
to  Russia  ever  reached  that  country,  but  that  by  far  the  greater  part  was 
diverted  to  the  contraband  trade.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  these 
figures  with  those  in  the  following  table,  compiled  from  figures  fur- 
nished by  the  British  Government  and  appearing  in  the  records  of 
the  seventh,  eighth  and  ninth  sessions  of  the  Advisory  Committee 
(1925-27),  at  which  this  subject  of  contraband  trade  was  discussed 
at  greater  length. 


21 


Persian  Opium  Known  to  Have  Been  Shipped  from  the  Port  of  Bushire, 

1924-19265 


May  1, 

1924- 

June 

1,  1925- 

April  1, 

1926- 

Declared 

May  31 

, 1925 

April 

30,  1926 

November  30,  1926 

Destination* 

Cases 

Pounds 

Cases 

Pounds 

Cases 

Pounds 

Vladivostok  

4,489 

718,240 

5,784 

925,440 

2,958 

473,280 

Dairen  

506 

80,960 

200 

32,000 

200 

32,000 

Keelung  

371 

59,360 

581 

92,960 

50 

8,000 

Macao  

350 

56,000 

Singapore  

175 

28,000 

1,850 

296,000 

Hamburg  

80 

12,800 

TT  .S  A . 

5 

800 

Hongkongt  

25 

4,000 

Kobe  

100 

16,000 

Total 

6,456  1,032,960 

6,669 

1,067,040 

5,067 

810,720 

• It  will  be  noted  that  the  items  listed  in  this  table  account  for  the  majority  of  shipment*, 
but  not  for  the  total  amounts  quoted.  Some  of  these  transactions  were  legitimate,  others  illicit, 
t Destination  believed  by  British  authorities  to  be  incorrectly  stated. 

Itemized  reports  of  exports  from  Bushire  during  the  years  1922-24  were 
not  published  by  the  Advisory  Committee.  It  did,  however,  publish  a 
summary,  based  on  British  reports,  giving  the  totals  as  follows : 


Persian  Opium  Known  to  Have  Been  Shipped  from  the  Port  of  Bushire, 

1922-19245a 

Cases  Pounds 


1922  1,549  247,840 

1923  5,914  946,240 

1924  5,008  801,280 


(Official  Persian  customs  returns  did  not  correspond  with  the  above, 
inasmuch  as  they  indicated  the  total  exports  for  1922  to  have  been  257,503 
lbs.,  and  those  for  1923  to  have  been  665,312  lbs.) 

The  disparity  between  the  Persian  and  British  figures  does  not  alter 
one  of  the  main  deductions  that  are  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  above 
figures — viz.,  that  between  the  years  1922  and  1926  Persian  opium  ex- 
ports were  gaining  rapidly,  while  figures  for  seven  months  of  the  year 
1926-27  indicated  that  there  was  no  falling  off  of  opium  exports  in  the 
latter  period. 

Returning  to  the  information  contained  in  the  Persian  Memoran- 
dum submitted  to  the  Second  Opium  Conference  in  November,  1924, 
a second  feature  should  be  referred  to,  which  explained  the  tenacity 
with  which  Persia  clung  to  the  right  to  export  all  the  opium  for 
which  it  could  find  a market.  Opium  exports,  the  report  stated,  ac- 

(5)  League  of  Nations.  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Seventh,  Beighth  and 
Ninth  Sessions.  Report  to  the  Council. 

(6a)  League  of  Nations.  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Seventh  Session. 
Report  to  the  Council,  p.  II2. 


22 


counted  for  20  or  25  per  cent®  of  all  Persian  exports  exclusive  of  oil/ 
In  the  view  of  the  Persian  Government  a country  possessing  a per- 
ennially adverse  trade  balance  could  not  afford  to  overlook  a fact  of 
this  importance. 

The  total  amounts  of  opium  exported  from  Persia  varied  from 
year  to  year  but  had  not  yet  reached  pre-war  levels.  The  total 
amount  recorded  in  1913-14  had  been  770,516  lbs. — a figure  exceeded 
in  the  two  following  years.  The  point  of  lowest  depression  had  been 
reached  in  1921-22  when  255,697  lbs.  were  exported.  In  1923-24  the 
figure  had  risen  to  690,833  Ibs.^ 

A third  feature  of  the  Persian  memorandum  was  the  emphasis  it 
laid  upon  a sudden  increase  in  opium  importation  into  Persia  which, 
it  indicated,  had  taken  place  since  1921.  In  the  year  1920-21  only  286 
lbs.  of  opium  had  been  imported  into  Persia.  In  1921-22  the  figure 
had  risen  to  955  lbs.  In  1922-23  it  rose  again  to  15,034  lbs.  and  in 
1923-24  to  22,074  lbs.  This  phenomenon  appeared  to  be  due  in  part 
to  the  fact  that  increasingly  severe  export  regulations  encouraged 
merchants  in  neighboring  countries  to  consign  their  cargoes  to  Persia, 
where  they  were  transhipped  at  the  port  of  Bushire.  This,  it  was 
said,  had  been  true  in  the  case  of  Indian  opium  in  the  year  1923-24.®®' 
It  was  also  true  in  the  case  of  opium  from  Afghanistan. 

Persia  did  not  look  with  favor  on  this  new  development,  inasmuch 
as  fictitiously  augmented  export  figures  resulted  in  bringing  unnec- 
essary odium  upon  Persia,  while  at  the  same  time  the  new  trade 
served  to  depress  the  market  value  of  Persian  opium  itself.®  Rep- 
resentations on  the  subject  were  made  to  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
who  later  issued  a decision  prohibiting  the  importation  of  foreign 
opium  into  Persia  or  its  transhipment  at  Persian  ports. 

India’s  attitude  in  the  matter  had  the  effect  of  strengthening  the 
Persian  Government’s  hand,  inasmuch  as  the  Indian  authorities  now 


(6)  To  avoid  paying  export  taxes  in  full,  merchants  were  accustomed  to  value  their 
shipments  at  a lower  figure  than  was  actually  commanded  in  foreign  markets.  Thus  it  was 
that  although  in  customs  statistics  for  the  years  1919  to  1924  the  percentage  of  opium  exports 
to  total  exports  (exclusive  of  oil)  ranged  from  8.6  per  cent  to  16.1  per  cent,  the  Persian 
Government  was  willing  to  subscribe  to  the  statement  which  placed  the  percentage  con- 
siderably higher. 

(7)  Persian  oil-fields  were  under  development  by  foreign  concessionaires  who  accord- 
ingly enjoyed  the  profits  derived  from  oil  exports.  Persia  received  only  a royalty,  the  wages 
paid  to  employees  of  the  company  and  the  amounts  spent  in  the  purchase  of  supplies  within 
the  country.  Therefore,  it  was  customary  for  oil  to  be  listed  separately  or  omitted  entirely 
from  Persian  export  statistics. 

(8)  For  full  statistics,  including  tables  showing  declared  destinations  in  1922-24,  see 
Annex  V,  page  55, 

(8a).  The  accuracy  of  the  detailed  Persian  statistics  regarding  transhipment  of  Indian 
opium  at  Bushire  during  the  year  1923-24  was  to  be  questioned  by  Sir  John  Campbell  at 
the  Seventh  Session  of  the  Advisory  Committee  in  August,  1925. 

(9)  LfCague  of  Nations.  Second  Opium  Conference.  Geneva,  November  17,  1924-Pebru- 
ary  19,  1926.  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  p.  205. 

(10)  Administrator-General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia.  Eighth  Quarterly  Report,  June 
%2-Septem'ber  22,  1924. 


23 


prohibited  all  exports  of  opium  to  Persia.  This  was  done  in  the  belief 
that  all  opium  exported  to  Persia  would  go  to  swell  the  volume 
available  for  the  illicit  trade.^^ 

PERSIA  AT  THE  SECOND  OPIUM  CONFERENCE 

That  Persia  felt  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  it  at  Geneva  to 
relinquish  its  doctrine  of  a free  opium  export  trade  is  suggested  in  the 
Eighth  Quarterly  Report  of  the  Administrator  General  of  the 
Finances  ( June-September,  1924),  published  about  the  time  when 
the  Second  Opium  Conference  met.  Designed  as  a warning  to 
Persian  opium  producers  that  it  might  be  an  unfortunate  thing  for 
themselves  if  they  failed  to  fall  in  line  with  the  opium  policy  which 
the  Government  had  proposed  in  its  Memorandum  to  the  Second 
Opium  Conference,  the  report  also  represented  a not  uncommon 
point  of  view  with  regard  to  the  precariousness  of  Persia’s  hold  on 
foreign  markets — a point  of  view  which  ought  to  be  remembered 
if  the  attitude  adopted  by  Persia  at  Geneva  is  to  be  thoroughly  under- 
stood. The  report  read  in  part : 

“It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  the  other  powers  cannot  prevent 
the  cultivation  of  opium  in  Persia  and  cannot  entirely  prevent  its  shipment, 
they  can  prevent  the  shipment  of  opium  through  normal  channels  and  its 
sale  in  the  legitimate  markets  of  the  world.  Were  this  done,  the  only  sale 
for  Persian  opium  would  be  through  two  channels,  both  apparently  contra- 
band. This  would  mean  a monopoly  of  purchase  and  consequently  de- 
pressed prices  for  the  Persian  producers  and  merchants.  Another  danger 
of  being  temporarily  barred  from  the  legitimate  markets  of  the  world  is 
the  fact  that  this  would  permit  other  opium  growing  countries  to  obtain 
the  business  in  legitimate  opium  that  now  goes  to  Persia.  If  they  once 
obtain  such  an  advantage  it  would  be  difficult  for  Persia  ever  to  recover 
this  trade. 

“For  these  reasons  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  opium  cultiva- 
tors and  merchants  fully  cooperate  with  the  Government  in  taking  such 
measures  as  are  possible  at  present  to  bring  about  a better  control  over  the 
traffic.  If  they  do  this  and  Persia  is  thus  enabled  to  show  the  other  na- 
tions that  serious  steps  are  being  taken,  it  will  certainly  be  possible  to 
obtain  sufficient  time  to  make  the  change  gradually  (i.  e.,  substitution  of 
other  crops  for  opium)  and  to  retain  for  Persia  a large  share  of  the 
world’s  opium  production,  while  at  the  same  time  accomplishing  a ma- 
terial improvement  in  the  economic  condition  of  the  opium  growing  prov- 
inces and  of  the  Empire  as  a whole.” 

Already  the  American  Mission  had  devoted  some  thought  to  the 
substitution  scheme  here  referred  to.  Its  suggestions  were  embodied 
in  the  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  already  mentioned,  which 
Prince  Arfa-ed-Dowleh  presented  to  the  Second  Opium  Conference 
in  November,  1924.  The  memorandum  outlined  measures  Persia 

(11)  Leairue  of  Nations.  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Minutes  of  the 
Seventh  Session,  August  24-31,1926. 


24 


might  take  to  improve  its  lands,  its  communications,  its  irrigation 
system  and  its  agricultural  methods  so  as  to  increase  ordinary  sources 
of  revenue  preparatory  to  experimenting  in  opium  reduction. 

In  view  of  what  had  transpired  in  former  years,  the  members  of 
the  Second  Opium  Conference  were  interested  primarily  in  the  new 
declaration  of  policy  to  which  these  suggestions  served  as  a preface. 
The  Persian  Government  now  declared  that  it  was  in  full  accord  and 
sympathy  with  the  efforts  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  eradicate  the 
illicit  trade  in  dangerous  drugs.  It  promised  to  withdraw  its  reser- 
vation to  Article  3 of  the  Treaty  of  1912  and  to  accept  the  system  of 
opium  import  certificates  as  soon  as  it  was  economically  possible  to 
do  so.^2 

The  report  went  on  to  say  that  the  amount  of  capital  invested  in 
the  cultivation  of  and  commerce  in  opium  and  the  number  of  people 
dependent  thereon  for  support  was  so  great  that  a carefully  worked 
out  plan  of  crop  substitution,  a large  capital  investment,  and  the 
provision  of  adequate  technical  advice  and  direction  were  necessary 
before  any  serious  progress  could  be  made.  But  if  these  facilities 
were  provided,  it  was  a practical  certainty  that  the  production  of 
opium  in  Persia  could  be  reduced  to  medicinal  and  scientific  require- 
ments within  an  approximate  period  of  ten  years. 

Persia  was  not  in  a position  to  provide  for  any  such  heavy  expen- 
ditures as  the  above  program  would  require.  Its  revenues  were 
barely  sufficient  to  meet  the  current  expenses,  and  prospective  in- 
creases in  national  revenues  would  have  to  be  devoted  in  large 
measure  to  certain  reproductive  public  works.  Furthermore,  an  ordi- 
nary loan  would  not  serve  Persia’s  needs  in  this  regard,  since  it 
would  be  difficult  to  meet  the  interest  before  substitute  crops  and 
revenue-producing  public  works  were  established  on  a paying  basis. 
Thus  there  were  three  conditions  which  would  have  to  be  fulfilled 
before  Persia  could  conform  to  the  wishes  of  the  League  in  the 
matter  of  its  opium  policy. 

1.  It  must  receive  a loan  of  ten  million  tomans  for  twenty  years  at  a 
rate  not  to  exceed  S per  cent,  per  annum,  no  interest  being  charged  for 
the  first  five  years.  One-tenth  of  the  loan  should  be  payable  annually 
beginning  with  the  eleventh  year.^^ 

2.  During  the  transition  period,  foreign  Governments  having  claims 
against  Persia  must  grant  a moratorium,  releasing  the  country  temporarily 
from  a financial  burden  of  from  one  to  two  million  tomans  per  annum 
during  the  difficult  period  when  the  revenues  were  being  reorganized. 

(12)  At  the  Second  Opium  Conference  a more  detailed  scheme  than  that  of  1921  (see 
above,  page  18)  was  adopted  for  controlling  the  export  of  opium  and  manufactured  drugs. 
The  new  measures  were  expected  to  ensure  that  every  nation  should  receive  only  the  raw 
material  or  drugs  necessary  for  its  needs,  and  thus  become  fully  responsible  for  the  amount 
of  its  importations.  For  the  text  of  the  new  provisions  for  establishing  individual  export  and 
import  certificates  see  Chapter  V of  the  Second  Opium  Convention,  Articles  12-18. 

(13)  It  was  pointed  out  that  this  would  cost  the  governments  concerned  approximately 
500,000  tomans  annually  for  the  first  five  years.  Persia’s  loss  of  revenue  during  the  transition 
period  would  be  much  greater. 


25 


3.  Restrictions  on  Persia’s  liberty  of  action  in  tariff  questions!^  must  be 
removed  and  the  assistance  of  interested  Governments  secured  in  increasing 
the  Customs  revenues. 

Several  considerations  led  the  Persian  Government  to  feel  that  it 
had  a right  to  make  these  demands.  Although  a neutral  country, 
Persia  had  been  invaded  and  ravaged  during  the  war.  It  had  re- 
ceived no  reparations.  Neither  had  it  floated  a reconstruction  loan. 
The  country  was  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy  and  could  not  afford 
to  complicate  its  financial  difficulties  by  permitting  such  an  economic 
disturbance  as  would  be  caused  by  the  suppression  of  the  opium 
industry,  unless,  prior  to  taking  the  initial  steps,  a practicable  pro- 
gram of  substitution  was  before  it,  together  with  the  requisite  capital 
and  technical  assistance. 

The  Persian  Government  reminded  the  League  that  the  question 
was  one  which  affected  a fifth  of  Persia’s  exports,  a twelfth  of  its 
revenues  and  the  means  of  livelihood  of  a very  great  number  of  its 
citizens.  It  maintained  that  since  I’ersia  was  an  impoverished  country 
and  among  those  least  able  to  bear  losses  of  revenue,  it  was  only  fair 
to  expect  that  the  vastly  richer  nations  “for  whose  sake  Persia  (was) 
being  asked  to  undertake  financial  sacrifice  and  run  the  risk  of  political 
disturbance,”  should  defray  the  cost. 

In  accordance  with  its  instructions,  the  Persian  delegation  inti- 
mated that  its  government  could  not  be  expected  to  ratify  the  Second 
Opium  Convention  unless  the  three  main  proposals  it  had  put  forward 
were  accepted  as  they  stood  in  the  Persian  memorandum.  Sub-Com- 
mittee B,  before  which  the  proposals  were  laid,  felt,  however,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  it  to  examine  the  material  and  practical  side  of 
the  Persian  requests  in  the  absence  of  information  collected  by  experts 
on  the  spot.  Mrs.  Hamilton  Wright,  of  the  American  delegation, 
holding  that  it  was  necessary  to  get  the  co-operation  of  producing 
countries,  suggested  that  a small  committee  composed  of  agricultur- 
ists, bankers,  etc.,  should  be  sent  to  Persia  and  other  producing  coun- 
tries to  enquire  into  their  needs  and  see  what  steps  could  be  taken. 
The  Conference  adopted  this  suggestion  in  modified  form.  With  the 
assent  of  the  Persian  Government  it  decided  on  December  17  to 
recommend  that  a small  committee  of  qualified  experts  be  despatched 
to  Persia  to  enquire  into  actual  conditions  in  that  country,  with  a 
view  to  determining  the  suitability  of  the  Persian  proposals.  (For 
a further  account  of  this  Commission  of  Enquiry  see  below,  page  28.) 

It  was  during  the  sessions  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference,  before 
the  decision  had  been  made  to  adopt  the  foregoing  resolution,  that 

(14)  A series  of  treaties  with  foreign  powers  beginning  with  the  Treaty  of  Turkmanchai 
in  1828  established  tariff  rates  which  could  not  be  altered  except  by  special  agreement  be- 
tween Persia  and  the  government  of  the  country  concerned.  Tariff  rates  varied  widely. 
Dr.  A.  C.  Millspaugh  in  The  American  Task  in  Persia  summarized  the  situation  in  saying  that 
commodities  which  were  of  interest  to  Russia  bore  an  average  tax  of  4.75  per  cent  while 
commodities  of  interest  to  Great  Britain  paid  an  average  of  26.77  per  cent. 

26 


Prince  Ar£a-ed-Dowleh  entered  a plea  for  greater  attention  on  the 
part  of  the  League  to  the  position  and  needs  of  all  opium-producing 
countries.  Turkey,  Afghanistan,  Egypt,  Turkestan,  Bokhara,  Khiva, 
and  Turkman,  which  had  not  yet  joined  the  League  of  Nations,  were 
not  represented  on  the  Opium  Committees.  But  they  were  all  opium 
producing  countries.  Persia,  which  did  have  a representative  at 
Geneva,  had  not  been  consulted.  No  one  had  asked  the  Persian  dele- 
gate what  was  the  position  of  his  countr)%  or  how  the  League  could 
help  Persia  in  its  difficulties.  The  only  question  asked  hitherto  was 
why  Persia  did  not  destroy  its  poppy  plantations  once  and  for  all. 
No  one  seemed  to  realize  that  Persia  could  not  decree  the  starvation 
of  thousands  of  men,  women  and  children  employed  in  the  cultivation 
of  opium,  which  for  centuries  had  been  their  sole  means  of  livelihood. 

PERSIAN  EXPORT  POLICY  SINCE  THE  GENEVA  CONFERENCE 

When  the  Advisory  Committee  met  again  in  August,  1925,  to  take 
stock  of  the  situation  created  by  the  recent  Opium  Conference  and  to 
prepare  for  the  Assembly  meeting  of  the  following  months,  certain 
of  its  members  objected  more  insistently  than  ever  before  to  the 
difficulties  Persia’s  opium  policy  was  creating  for  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

Longer  statements  than  ever  were  transmitted  to  the  Council  on 
the  subject  of  Persian  opium.  It  was  pointed  out  that  export  of 
opium  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the  Far  East  was  (next  to  the  pro- 
duction of  opium  in  China)  the  most  important  factor  in  the  illicit 
traffic  in  opium  carried  on  in  the  Far  East.  Reports  in  the  possession 
of  the  Advisory  Committee  showed  that  large  quantities  were  declared 
for  destinations  which  they  never  reached.  The  Committee  consid- 
ered that  measures  for  the  effective  control  of  the  export  traffic  were 
of  the  first  importance.  Complete  control  could  only  be  secured  by 
the  adoption  and  enforcement  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  Government 
of  the  system  of  export  licenses  and  import  certificates,  and  it  recom- 
mended to  the  Council  and  to  the  Assembly  that  urgent  represent- 
ations should  be  addressed  to  the  Persian  Government  requesting  it 
to  put  this  system  into  force  without  delay. 

But  merely  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Persia  by  means  of  a 
communication  from  the  League  repeating  what  it  had  frequently 
said  before  appeared  to  be  a futile  procedure.  Accordingly  the  Ad- 
visory Committee  varied  its  method  by  adopting  two  additional 
recommendations.  The  first  suggested  that  Powers  whose  flag  was 
carried  by  ships  trading  in  the  Persian  Gulf  should  adopt  measures 
to  control  the  conveyance  of  opium  from  the  Persian  Gulf  on  such 
ships,  and  to  prevent  its  diversion  into  the  illicit  traffic.  The  second 
suggested  that  Powers  at  whose  ports  vessels  conveying  opium  from 
the  Persian  Gulf  called  should  put  in  force  at  once  measures  described 

27 


in  Chapter  V of  the  Second  Opium  Convention  for  controlling  trans- 
shipment of  consignments  of  opium  and  dangerous  drugs. 

All  three  resolutions  were  forwarded  in  October,  1925,  to  the  Per- 
sian Government  and  to  a number  of  other  powers.  But  when  the 
Advisory  Committee  convened  for  its  eighth  session  (May-June,  1926) 
the  situation  had  not  altered  appreciably,  except  in  one  respect.  On 
January  1,  1925,  British  regulations  had  gone  into  force  to  prevent 
British  vessels  from  being  employed  in  the  conveyance  of  opium  ex- 
ported from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the  Far  East  for  illicit  purposes. 
These  regulations  appeared  to  be  having  the  effect  desired  so  far  as 
British  ships  were  concerned,  but  ships  of  other  nationalities  were 
profiting  by  the  opportunity  to  divide  the  former  British  trade  among 
themselves. 

Once  more  the  Advisory  Committee  appealed  to  the  powers  for 
assistance.  It  stated  that  the  bulk  of  the  opium  exported  from  the 
Persian  Gulf  continued  to  be  sent  to  the  Far  East  under  false  declara- 
tion of  destination^^  and  undoubtedly  found  its  way  into  the  illicit 
traffic.  It  asked  the  Council  to  make  urgent  representations  to  the 
Governments  of  those  countries  whose  ships  were  still  engaged  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  traffic  to  take  the  measures  necessary  for  control 
of  the  traffic.  The  Committee  further  recommended  that  the  Govern- 
ments of  powers  having  extra-territorial  rights  in  Persia  be  asked  to 
institute  control  over  their  nationals  in  Persia  on  the  lines  of  the  regu- 
lations already  made  by  Great  Britain.  (The  latter  had  provided 
by  orders-in-council  issued  in  1901  and  1907  that  no  British  subject 
might  engage  in  the  Persian  opium  trade  unless  he  possessed  a gen- 
eral or  special  license  granted  by  the  British  Consul-General.) 

Seven  months  later  when  the  Advisory  Committee  convened  for  its 
ninth  session,  (January-Eebruary,  1927)  it  had  the  satisfaction  of 
learning  that  the  Japanese  Government  had  succeeded  in  practically 
putting  a stop  to  the  use  of  Japanese  ships  in  the  Persian  Gulf  trade. 
Thus  its  plans  had  advanced  a second  step. 

It  was  only  a month  later  that  an  event  occurred  which  made  it 
seem  not  impossible  that  another  step  of  a different  sort  might  soon 
Be  made  toward  the  settlement  of  the  Persian  opium  question.  This 
event  was  the  presentation  to  the  Council  of  the  completed  report  of 
the  League  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Production  of  Opium 
in  Persia. 

It  was  the  Fifth  Assembly  which,  acting  on  a suggestion  from  the 
Second  Opium  Conference  and  a strong,  recommendation  from  the 
Fifth  Committee,  had  provided  in  a resolution  of  September  26,  1925, 
for  the  despatch  of  such  a Commission  to  Persia  to  study  the  existing 
situation  with  regard  to  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy  and  the  replace- 


(15)  For  statistics  see  page  22. 


28 


ment  of  a portion  of  this  crop  by  other  crops.  The  Commission, 
consisting  of  Mr.  Frederic  A.  Delano  (U.S.A.)  as  President  and  Dr. 
Fridiano  Cavara  (Italy)  and  M.  Victor  Cayla  (France)  as  members, 
accompanied  by  an  American  agricultural  expert,  a general  secretary, 
private  secretary  and  stenographer,  left  Geneva  for  Persia  on  March 
11,  1926.  The  Commission  returned  to  Marseilles  on  June  16,  after 
having  spent  seventy-five  days  in  Persia.  In  this  period  it  visited 
sections  of  the  country  as  wddely  separated  as  Meshed  and  Muham- 
march,  Turkmanchai  and  Shiraz.  (For  itinerary  of  the  Commission  see 
map  below.) 


Sketch  Map  of  Persia 

(Showing  itinerary  of  League  Commission  of  Enquiry) 


The  report  to  the  League  Council  prepared  by  the  Delano  Com- 
mission was  based  on  a study  of  relevant  documents,  supplemented 
by  personal  interviews  and  first-hand  observation.  It  discussed  the 
bearing  of  Persia’s  geographical,  agricultural,  and  economic  situation 
upon  the  question  of  crop  substitution,  as  well  as  problems  of  trans- 

29 


portation,  commerce,  industry,  land  tenure  and  taxation.  On  the 
strength  of  these  studies  the  Commission  expressed  a conviction  that 
Persia  ought  to  find  it  feasible  to  adopt  a program  for  gradual  cur- 
tailment of  opium  production.  It  took  the  view  that  although  such 
curtailment  would  be  attended  by  manifold  difficulties,  the  resulting 
economic  benefit  would  outweigh  initial  disadvantages. 

This  conclusion  was  not  advanced  without  a considerable  body  of 
supporting  evidence,  the  most  convenient  summary  of  which  is  to 
be  found  in  the  personal  review  of  the  salient  features  of  the  report 
prepared  by  the  Chairman,  Mr.  Delano. No  clearer  conception  of 
the  original  findings  of  the  Commission  may  be  gathered  from  a brief 
resume  than  by  reading  this  outline,  reproduced  in  Annex  II,  page  40 
of  the  present  study.  Similarly,  the  general  conclusions  and  recom- 
mendations of  the  Commission  may  be  most  readily  reviewed  in  the 
Commission’s  own  outline  (see  Annex  III,  page  44),  which  should 
be  read  in  connection  with  the  foregoing. 

On  comparing  the  proposals  of  the  Commission  of  Enquiry  with 
the  demands  presented  by  the  Persian  delegation  at  the  Second  Opium 
Conference  in  November,  1924,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  while  the 
League  Commission  maintained  that  Persia  should  be  permitted  a 
free  hand  in  readjusting  its  customs  tariffs  it  said  nothing  whatever 
about  a moratorium  nor  did  it  advocate  a foreign  loan.  In  place  of 
these  two  demands  formerly  put  forward  by  the  Persian  Government, 
the  League  Commission  of  Enquiry  now  stressed  the  importance  of 
general  revenue-producing  policies.  It  suggested  that  before  it  under- 
took an  active  reduction  program,  Persia  should  be  given  three  years 
to  improve  its  internal  economic  condition,  by  beginning  road  con- 
struction, adjusting  import  tariffs  and  improving  agricultural  meth- 
ods. After  the  three-year  period  of  preparation,  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment would  be  in  a position  to  begin  annual  ten  per  cent  reductions 
of  its  opium  production.  But  even  before  it  reached  this  stage,  meas- 
ures ought  to  be  taken  to  make  control  of  present  opium  production 
and  distribution  more  effective. 

The  Commission  made  a few  definite  suggestions  as  to  how  this 
control  might  be  improved  without  waiting  for  the  three-year  pre- 
paratory period  to  elapse.  Its  suggestions  are  embodied  in  the  follow- 
ing extract  from  the  text  of  the  Commission’s  report 

“1.  It  is  at  present  the  practice  to  collect  very  high  taxes  and  fees  on 
the  stick  opium  intended  for  home  consumption,  while  imposing  smaller 
charges  on  export  opium.  This  difference,  which  varies  according  to  the 
distance  of  the  place  of  manufacture  from  the  port  of  export,  makes  these 
charges  frequently  16  times  higher  in  the  case  of  opium  prepared  for 
home  consumption. 

(16)  Transmitted  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  in  a letter  dated  April  23, 
1927.  (Council  Document  A.  16.  1927.  XI.) 

(16a)  League  of  Nations.  Heport  of  the  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Production  of 
Opium  in  Persia,  p.  41. 


30 


“The  Commission  believes  this  difference  to  be  unjustifiable.  The  tax 
on  opium  for  home  consumption  is  so  high  as  to  lend  itself  to  all  kinds  of 
evasion,  while  the  export  tax  might  well  be  higher  and  so  yield  more 
revenue. 

“2.  There  is  no  form  of  license  or  registration  for  the  ground  allocated 
to  opium  cultivation,  and  no  tax  collected  on  ground  allocation  except  the 
regular  land  tax.  This  should  be  remedied. 

“3.  While  in  some  districts  opium  is  duly  delivered  to  the  Government 
warehouse  and  manufactured  there  into  stick  or  cake  opium,  the  Commis- 
sion observed  that  in  certain  cities  the  Government  had  found  it  expedient 
to  leave  the  manufacture  of  opium  for  export  entirely  in  private  hands, 
although  under  the  more  or  less  strict  supervision  of  its  officials.  Where 
the  manufacture  is  left  to  private  persons,  it  is  rare  for  the  opium  to  be 
identified  by  marks  showing  place  of  origin,  etc. 

“The  identity  of  all  opium  should  certainly  be  clearly  marked  or  stamped 
upon  each  piece. 

“4.  Merchants,  pedlars,  etc.,  are  understood  to  be  licensed  and  to  pay 
a license  fee.  The  fee  is  a low  one  and  hardly  commensurate  with  the 
volume  and  character  of  the  business  transacted,  while  the  merchants 
(whether  great  or  small)  are  not  required  to  file  any  surety  bond  in  a 
substantial  sum  for  the  observance  of  the  law  or  the  payment  of  Govern- 
ment fees  or  taxes,  although  it  should  be  added  that  the  Commission  was 
informed  that  merchants  intending  to  export  opium  were  obliged  to  make 
a declaration  to  that  effect  and  to  give  a bond  for  the  difference  between 
the  excise  tax  and  the  export  duty  on  the  amount  of  opium  declared  for  export. 
A large  opium  merchant  told  the  Commission  that  a case  of  opium  worth 
750  to  800  tomans  at  Bushire  with  taxes  paid  would  fetch  2,100  tomans  at 
Shanghai,  thus  indicating  that  Persia  was  selling  her  opium  too  cheaply 
or  failing  to  tax  it  at  its  true  value. 

“In  its  memorandum  to  the  Second  Opium  Conference  (Document  O.  D. 
C.  24)  the  Persian  Government  estimates  that,  whereas  1,340,000  lbs.  of 
opium  were  registered  with  the  Government  as  the  annual  production 
for  the  year  1923-24,  the  actual  production  for  that  year  was  as  much  as 
1,950,000  lbs.  In  other  words,  the  Government  assumes  that  610,000  lbs. 
or  33  per  cent,  evaded  taxation  by  escaping  Government  supervision.” 

The  Persian  Government  was  not  prepared  to  accept  the  Commis- 
sion’s general  proposals  in  their  entirety.  In  agreement  with  the 
intention  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  above  recommendations 
of  the  Commission,  it  did  promise  to  study  the  increase  of  export 
customs  duties  on  such  opium  as  was  exported  without  certificate,  and 
likewise  to  study  changing  the  existing  taxes  on  opium  to  other 
taxes  which  would  facilitate  a decrease  in  cultivation  of  and  commerce 
in  opium.  But  in  the  matter  of  the  Commission’s  main  recommend- 
ations, it  had  certain  important  reservations  to  propose.  It  expressed 
willingness  to  enter  upon  a plan  for  the  reduction  of  opium  production 
after  a three  year  preparatory  period,  but  stipulated  that  annual  ten 
per  cent  reductions  should  take  the  form  of  a three  year  experiment 
only,  at  the  end  of  which  the  Persian  Government  would  reconsider 

31 


its  own  economic  position  and  observe  the  degree  to  which  other 
producing  countries  had  curtailed  their  production  of  the  raw  material 
and  of  the  manufactured  product.  It  would  also  take  into  account 
reductions  which  had  occurred  during  the  three  year  period  in  world 
manufacture  and  distribution  of  habit-forming  drugs.  But  because 
the  Commission  had  not  stated  the  time  which,  in  its  estimation,  the 
substitution  program  would  require,  nor  what  the  cost  of  substitution 
would  be,  the  Persian  Government  maintained  that  it  could  not  ask 
the  Mejliss  to  endorse  an  unqualified  program  of  reduction. 

The  Persian  Government  promised  to  ask  the  Mejliss  to  grant  five 
year  exemptions  from  land  taxes  in  the  case  of  areas  diverted  from 
opium  cultivation  to  that  of  substitute  crops,  and  preference  in  agri- 
cultural loans  to  cultivators  who  were  giving  up  opium  production. 

The  Persian  Government’s  attitude  in  relation  to  the  adoption  of 
import  and  export  certificates  was  expressed  in  the  following  terms : 
It  would  submit  to  the  Mejliss,  with  recommendation  for  its  enact- 
ment into  law,  a program  lit  had  prepared  for  “acceptance  of  the  opium 
import  certificate  system  with  an  annual  reduction,  beginning  not 
later  than  the  third  year  after  the  present,  of  10  per  cent  of  the 
quantity  annually  permitted  to  leave  the  country  without  production 
of  opium  import  certificates.”  This  was  subject  to  the  reservation 
that,  as  in  the  case  of  the  ten  per  cent  reduction  plan,  the  Persian 
Government  would  later  reconsider  its  position  in  relation  to  the 
world  situation. 

Already  a project  of  law  had  been  prepared  (see*  Eighteenth 
Quarterly  Report  of  the  Administrator  General  of  the  Finances  of 
Persia)  providing  for  the  establishment  of  a Government  monopoly 
of  opium,  tobacco  and  matches,  together  with  the  establishment  of 
income  taxes,  in  a comprehensive  plan  for  modifying  an  age-old  land 
tax,  recognized  to  be  placing  a burden  on  agriculture  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  actual  revenue  returns.  In  this  connection  the  Ad- 
ministrator General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia  wrote:  “If  it  is  necessary 
to  obtain  an  increase  of  revenue  to  offset  the  loss  of  revenue  from 
the  reduction  or  assignment  of  land  taxes,  it  seems  evident  that  the 
new  taxes  should  be  imposed  on  imports  of  luxuries  and  on  such 
commodities  as  tobacco  and  opium.  Tobacco  is  a luxury  commodity 
with  a steady  demand.  The  same  considerations  apply  to  opium,  with 
the  additional  consideration  in  the  case  of  opium  that  there  are 
international  obligations  to  be  fulfilled,  necessitating  a larger  measure 
of  governmental  control.” 


(17)  For  a highly  condensed  summary  of  the  Commission’s  proposals  and  the  Persian 
Government's  counter-proposals,  see  Revort  of  the  Fifth  Committee  to  the  Assembly,  Septem- 
ber, 1927.  (Council  Document  A.  66.  1927,  XI.)  For  the  text  of  the  Persian  Government's 

proposals,  see  Annex  IV,  p.  51-52.  For  comments  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  what  it 
considered  an  inadequate  declaration  by  the  Persian  Government,  see  p.  36. 

32 


The  Administrator  General  of  the  Finances  of  Persia  had  proceeded 
to  place  the  situation  before  the  Persian  people  in  the  following 
words : 

“In  order  that  the  assurances  given  by  the  Persian  Government  to  the 
League  of  Nations  should  be  carried  out  before  the  meeting  of  the  As- 
sembly in  September,  these  assurances,  together  with  a program  of  opium 
control  and  reduction,  have  been  embodied  in  the  general  fiscal  project. 
These  provisions  are  believed  to  be  in  the  interest  of  the  international 
position  of  Persia  and  also  in  the  interest  of  the  Persian  people  themselves. 
In  view  of  the  restrictions  that  are  being  placed  by  the  shipping  nations 
on  the  transport  of  opium,  it  is  evident  that  contraband  trade  in  opium 
will  in  the  near  future  be  stopped.  By  adopting  the  import  certificate 
system,  Persian  opium  merchants  should  be  able  to  obtain  a reasonable 
share  of  the  legitimate  trade  in  opium.  It  is  believed,  further,  that  the 
initial  reduction  in  production  can  be  carried  out  without  serious  hardship, 
and  that  in  the  end  the  Persian  landowners  and  peasants  now  engaged  in 
the  cultivation  of  opium  will  benefit  through  the  substitution  for  opium 
of  an  exportable  crop  for  which  there  may  be  a safe,  established  and 
increasing  market.  It  is  also  necessary  that  the  Persian  Government 
should,  like  other  governments,  take  steps  to  reduce  the  internal  con- 
sumption of  opium.  This  can  be  done  through  the  establishment  of  the 
requisite  means  of  control  by  the  Government.” 

The  points  on  which  the  Persian  Government  differed  from  the 
views  expressed  by  the  Commission  were  numerous.  In  this  case 
also  an  excellent  summary  exists  to  which  the  reader  is  referred. 
(See  Annex  IV,  page  49.)  From  a perusal  of  this  resume  it  becomes 
apparent  that  Persia  had  reduced  from  three  to  two  the  number  of 
conditions  it  now  demanded  as  a prerequisite  for  any  alteration  of 
its  traditional  opium  export  policy.  It  continued,  as  in  1924,  to  de- 
mand tariff  autonomy,  but  it  had  given  up  its  former  demands  for  a 
loan  and  moratorium.  It  intimated  now,  however,  that  it  would  not 
attempt  to  carry  on  indefinitely  its  prospective  experiment  in  crop 
reduction  unless  other  producing  and  manufacturing  nations  also 
reduced  their  output.  Contrary  to  the  beliefs  of  the  Commission,  it 
Held  that  Persian  opium  was  not  of  a quality  eminently  suitable  for 
use  in  drug  manufacture.  Hence  it  maintained  that  a reduction  in 
the  quantity  of  opium  produced  in  Persia  would  cause  no  appreciable 
reduction  in  the  quantity  of  raw  material  available  for  manufacture. 
It  asserted  that  in  order  to  reduce  drug  manufacture,  at  present  im- 
measurably greater  than  the  world’s  medicinal  and  scientific  require- 
ments, there  would  have  to  take  place  a simultaneous  and  drastic 
reduction  in  the  output  of  every  opium  producing  country  as  well  as 
in  the  output  of  countries  in  which  the  coca-leaf  was  produced. 

Four  League  bodies  discussed  the  report  of  the  Commission  of 
Enquiry  during  the  course  of  the  year  1927 — first  the  Council,  to 
which  it  was  originally  submitted,  then  the  Fifth  Committee  of  the 


33 


Assembly,  whose  duty  it  was  to  recommend  to  the  Assembly  a suit- 
able course  of  action  in  relation  to  the  report,  then  the  Assembly 
itself,  which  had  the  right  to  accept,  amend  or  reject  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  Fifth  Committee,  and  finally  the  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Traffic  in  Opium,  which  had  certain  comments  to  make 
to  the  Council  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  report  and 
the  Persian  Government’s  reply  and  concerning  questions  of  future 
policy  raised  by  both  documents. 

The  Council  in  the  month  of  March  did  not  find  itself  in  a position 
to  take  definitive  action  upon  the  Commission’s  report.  It  heard  the 
oral  statement  of  Colonel  D.  W.  MacCormack  in  support  of  the  views 
put  forward  by  the  Persian  Government.  But  since  circumstances 
had  prevented  the  Council  from  circulating  the  report  of  the  Com- 
mission and  the  Persian  observations  thereon  to  its  members  before 
the  date  of  meeting,  it  decided  to  place  the  question  of  opium  pro- 
duction in  Persia  upon  the  agenda  of  the  next  meeting  of  the  Assem- 
bly in  September,  it  being  suggested  that  members  of  the  Council 
reserve  all  comments  on  the  subject  until  that  time. 

The  Fifth  Committee  of  the  Assembly,  when  it  met  in  September, 
also  had  opportunities  to  listen  to  oral  statements  from  Colonel  Mac- 
Cormack who,  with  Hussein  Khan  Ala,  spoke  on  behalf  of  the  Persian 
Government  after  Mr.  Frederic  Delano,  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of 
Enquiry,  had  addressed  the  members  of  the  Fifth  Committee  on  behalf 
of  the  Commission. 

In  its  report  to  the  Assembly,  the  Fifth  Committee  described  the 
positions  assumed  by  the  Commission  of  Enquiry  and  the  Persian 
Government  respectively.  It  then  stated  that  the  experiment  which 
had  been  made  in  sending  the  Commission  of  Enquiry  to  Persia  was 
of  so  great  value  that  the  League  ought  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  further 
development  of  the  policy  thus  inaugurated.  It  suggested  that  the 
Persian  Government  keep  the  League  informed  of  further  develop- 
ments in  the  program  it  had  laid  down  for  its  own  guidance,  and 
expressed  the  firm  conviction  that  other  governments  concerned 
with  the  production  of  the  raw  material  and  with  the  manufacture  of 
narcotic  drugs  would  take  similar  or  equivalent  action.  It  appealed 
CO  all  governments  who  had  so  far  failed  to  do  so  to  ratify  the  Geneva 
Arrangement  and  Convention,  and  to  keep  the  League  informed  of  all 
enforcement  measures  they  were  adopting. 

Finally,  the  Fifth  Committee  of  the  Assembly  embodied  in  a resolu- 
tion the  course  of  action  which  it  suggested  that  the  Assembly  should 
adopt.  The  text  of  the  resolution  follows,  the  words  here  italicized 
representing  an  amendment  incorporated  in  it  on  the  suggestion  of 
Colonel  D.  W.  MacCormack: 

“The  Assembly  takes  note  of  the  report  of  the  Commission  of  Enquiry 
into  the  production  of  opium  in  Persia,  of  the  observations  of  the  Persian 


34 


Government  on  that  report,  and  of  the  letter  from  the  Chairman  of  the 
Commission  of  Enquiry  to  the  Secretary-General  dated  April  23rd,  1927. 

“It  expresses  its  sincere  thanks  to  the  members  of  the  Commission 
for  their  valuable  work  and  its  high  appreciation  of  the  good  will  shown 
by  the  Persian  Government  in  co-operation  with  the  League  in  its  at- 
tempts to  reach  a solution  of  the  difficult  and  complicated  problem  of 
narcotic  control. 

“The  Persian  Government  having  declared  that  the  success  of  its  pro- 
gramme will,  in  large  measure,  be  dependent  on  its  obtaining  liberty  of  action 
in  tariff  affairs  and  on  the  removal  of  the  restrictive  tariffs  on  Persian 
prodxicts  which  must  be  substituted  for  opium,  the  Assembly  expresses  the 
hope  that  the  Governments  concerned  will  give  their  earnest  and  favourable 
attention  to  those  conditions  and  that  the  Persian  Government  will  keep  the 
League  of  Nations  informed  of  the  progress  made  in  carrying  out  the  scheme 
proposed  for  the  gradual  diminution  of  the  cultivation  of  the  opium  poppy 
in  Persia. 

“It  earnestly  recommends  to  all  countries  concerned  with  the  produc- 
tion and  manufacture  of  dangerous  drugs  and  their  raw  material  the  en- 
actment of  legislation  similar  to  that  now  proposed  by  the  Government 
of  Persia,  or  such  equivalent  action  as  will  ensure  the  necessary  reduction 
of  raw  material  and  the  manufacture  of  drugs.’’ 

This  resolution,  in  practically  identical  form,  was  adopted  by  the 
Assembly. 

The  only  body  which  had  not  yet  had  the  report  of  the  Commission 
officially  before  it  was  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium. 
This  body  in  its  turn  considered  the  document  in  conjunction  with 
the  observations  of  the  Persian  Government,  at  its  tenth  session, 
(September  28  - October  8,  1927). 

Sir  Malcolm  Delevigne  (Chairman)  utilized  this  opportunity  to 
challenge  the  view  expressed  in  the  latter  document  that  Persian 
opium  was  not  of  a quality  to  be  useful  in  the  manufacture  of  drugs 
and  that  its  production  had  no  effect  on  the  drug  traffic.®  He  main- 
tained that  Persian  opium  had  been  used  for  the  manufacture  of  drugs 
in  the  pre-war  period  and  would  undoubtedly  be  so  used  again  if  it 
were  again  available  on  terms  similar  to  those  current  before  the  war. 

Sir  Malcolm  Delevigne  then  referred  to  a statement  of  great  impor- 
tance made  by  Colonel  MacCormack  in  his  speech  to  the  Fifth  Com- 
mittee. Colonel  MacCormack,  he  said,  had  pointed  out  that  the 
decision  of  the  Indian  Government  to  reduce  the  export  of  opium  had 
had  the  effect  of  transferring  to  the  Persian  market  the  demand  for 
raw  opium  from  countries  and  overseas  possessions  where  smoking 

(8)  The  various  pronouncements  made  on  this  subject  before  the  League  may  be  referred 
to  in  the  following  documents;  Report  of  the  League  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the  Pro- 
duction of  Opium  in  Persia,  p.  39.  Observations  of  the  Persian  Government  on  the  foregoing, 
pp.  1,  8-10,  23-24.  Letter  from  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  of  Enquiry  to  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  League,  p'.  4.  Report  of  the  Fifth  Committee  to  the  Assembly,  September  16, 
1927,  p.  2.  Statement  of  Colonel  D.  W.  MacCormack  to  Fifth  Committee  on  September  13, 
1927,  (Third  meeting).  Advisory  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Opium.  Minutes  of  the  Fourth 
Session  (1923)  p.  30.  Minutes  of  the  Tenth  Session  (1927)  p.  30. 

35 


of  opium  was  still  permitted.  Colonel  MacCormack  had  said,  further- 
more, that  opium  traders  had  informed  him  that  their  exports  were 
for  the  most  part  covered  by  the  opium  import  certificates.  This 
was  a gratifying  situation,  but,  as  Colonel  MacCormack  had  pointed 
out,  there  was  a corresponding  danger  to  be  noted.  This  danger 
lay  in  the  possible  augmentation  of  the  opposition  of  the  Persian 
opium  traders  to  the  Government  curtailment  programme,  in  view 
of  the  lucrative  new  business  opening  up  before  them.  From  this  it 
would  appear  that  Persian  cultivators  and  traders  would  try  to  keep 
their  hold  on  the  old  markets  for  which  import  certificates  were  not 
forthcoming  while  at  the  same  time  attaining  the  new.® 

An  expression  of  disappointment  followed,  because  of  the  fact  that 
the  Persian  Government  had  not  seen  its  way  clear  to  acquiesce  in 
the  whole  programme  suggested  by  the  Commission  of  Enquiry.  De- 
voted ever  since  its  own  establishment  to  the  task  of  securing  Persia’s 
adherence  to  the  full  measure  of  drug  control  suggested  for  inter- 
national observance,  and  faced  after  six  years  with  a material  increase 
rather  than  reduction  in  Persian  exports,  it  expressed  its  regret  in  the 
following  words,  addressed  to  the  Council  of  the  League: 

“.  . . Persia  has  not  yet  ratified  the  Hague  Convention  of  1917 ; 
and  her  signature  of  that  Convention  was  accompanied  by  the  impor- 
tant reservation  that  she  would  not  agree  to  undertake  measures  to 
prevent  the  export  of  raw  opium  to  countries  which  shall  have  pro- 
hibited its  entry.  The  Committee  feels  that,  with  this  vital  reserva- 
tion upon  a fundamental  point  still  in  force,  it  would  be  optimistic 
to  expect  that  much  progress  can  be  made  in  combating  the  illicit 
trade.  It  would  also  point  out  that  the  Persian  Government  proposes 
to  accept  the  import  and  export  certificate  system  three  years  hence; 
from  the  date  of  such  acceptance  it  will  reduce  by  ten  per  cent  each 
year  (subject  to  certain  conditions  and  reservations)  ‘the  quantity 
annually  permitted  to  leave  the  country  without  production  of  opium 
import  certificates.’  The  decision  by  India  to  reduce  her  exports  of 
opium  has  deflected  to  Persia  a large  demand  of  a legitimate  char- 
acter; this  must,  unless  the  total  amount  of  opium  produced  by  Persia 
be  increased,  lead  to  a diminution  of  the  quantity  of  opium  which  has 
in  the  past  found  its  way  from  that  country  into  illicit  channels. 
Broadly  speaking,  opium  which  leaves  Persia  uncovered  by  import 
certificates  gets  into  the  illicit  traffic ; the  undertaking  is  therefore  a 
conditional  promise  that,  three  years  hence,  the  Government  of  Persia 
will  begin  to  reduce  by  ten  per  cent  a year  a traffic  which  now  finds 
its  way,  almost  exclusively,  into  illicit  channels.  The  Committee 
cannot  but  regret  that  the  Persian  Government  should  have  felt  unable 
to  advance  further  than  this.  It  recognizes,  however,  that  the  action 

(9)  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  this  was  a conclusion  arrived  at  by  Sir  Malcolm 
Delevigne,  but  not  expressed  by  Colonel  MacCormack,  whose  statement  to  the  Fifth  Com- 
mittee in  September,  1927,  will  be  available  when  the  Minutes  have  been  published, 

36 


which  that  Government  agrees  to  take  constitutes  a considerable  step 
in  advance,  and  the  present  situation  is  so  menacing  that  it  welcomes 
any  amelioration  of  it.  It  will  watch  the  progress  which  may  be 
achieved  in  this  matter  with  the  most  lively  and  sympathetic 
interest.” 

CONCLUSION 

IN  looking  back  over  the  Persian  opium  situation  as  it  has  existed 
during  the  past  twenty  years,  there  appear  a few  salient  features 
which  might  perhaps  be  most  readily  summed  up  as  follows : 

Persia  is  one  of  the  states  which  has  associated  itself  with  inter- 
national efforts  to  control  opium  production  and  the  traffic  in  drugs 
ever  since  the  time  when  those  efforts  first  took  organized  form  in 
1909.  One  outstanding  limitation  has  hitherto  characterized  its 
participation  in  these  international  efforts — its  association  with  other 
nations  in  conferences  at  Shanghai,  The  Hague  and  Geneva  has  not 
led  hitherto  to  the  ratification  by  the  Persian  Mejliss  of  either  of  the 
international  opium  conventions. 

To  Persia  the  chief  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  ratifying  the 
Hague  Convention  has  been  the  clause  designed  to  establish  control 
by  national  governments  over  the  destination  of  opium  exports.  Never 
having  assumed  such  responsibility  in  the  past,  Persia  hesitated  to 
do  so  now,  lest  one  of  the  most  profitable  sources  of  gain  to  its 
citizens  and  revenue  to  the  government  coffers  should  be  stopped. 

By  the  year  1926  fifty-seven  other  nations,  by  ratifying  the  Hague 
Convention,  had  taken  the  step  Persia  had  refused  to  take.  Thirty- 
six  of  these  states  had  accepted  the  import  and  export  certificate 
system.  Thirty-three  had  announced  that  the  system  had  already 
been  put  into  force,  not  only  in  their  own  countries  but  also  in  ten 
of  their  colonies,  possessions  and  mandated  territories. 

Of  certain  of  these  states  it  could  not  be  said  that  they  were  en- 
forcing the  regulations  with  any  degree  of  thoroughness,  and  laxity 
on  the  part  of  some  was  proving  a source  of  irritation  to  those  who 
were  endeavoring  in  their  own  case  to  make  the  regulations  effective. 
Of  the  states  which  were  dilatory  in  enforcement  the  most  that  could 
be  said  was  that  they  had  accepted  the  import  and  export  system 
in  principle  at  least,  and  without  attempts  to  secure  indemnity  for 
loss  of  trade  which  that  acceptance  might  cause. 

With  Persia  the  case  was  different.  It  had  repeatedly  refused  to 
endorse  the  principle  of  export  and  import  certificates  unless  certain 
specific  demands  were  fulfilled.  These  demands  varied  in  detail 
from  year  to  year,  but  retained  the  essential  characteristic  of  requiring 
first  of  all  that  Persia’s  economic  position  should  not  be  injured  by 
any  change  which  the  Persian  Government  was  called  upon  to  adopt. 

37 


The  League  of  Nations  responded  to  Persia’s  first  demands  by- 
despatching  a Commission  of  Enquiry  to  investigate  on  the  spot  the 
actual  economic  requirements  of  the  country.  When  the  report  of 
that  Commission  was  completed  the  Persian  Government  responded 
by  presenting  fresh  demands  as  a condition  for  its  adoption  of  the 
import  and  export  certificate  system. 

These  demands  have  already  been  recorded.  It  is  significant  that 
in  announcing  its  conditional  and  temporary  adoption  of  import  and 
export  certificates,  the  Persian  Government  allows  itself  such  latitude 
in  the  interpretation  of  the  conditions  it  has  itself  laid  down  as  a 
pre-requisite  for  acceptance  of  the  system  in  toto,  that  it  becomes  im- 
possible for  anyone  to  predict  on  the  basis  of  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment’s report  whether  or  not  the  Persian  Council  of  Ministers  will 
go  so  far  as  to  recommend  to  the  Mejliss  sixt  years  from  now  a 
measure  finally  adopting  the  system.  Lastly,  as  the  Persian  Govern- 
ment has  pointed  out,  there  can  be  no  assurance  that  the  Mejliss 
would  ratify  any  such  measure  that  might  in  future  be  proposed  to  it. 
This  fact  is  one  of  the  important  features  of  the  Persian  proposals. 

Meanwhile  it  has  been  hinted  by  the  former  Director  General  of 
the  Persian  Internal  Revenue  Administration  that  a substantial 
change  is  occurring  in  Persian  exports  of  opium.  This  is  due  in  large 
part  to  the  fact  that  Persian  merchants  have  taken  advantage  of  the 
withdrawal  of  India  from  the  world’s  opium  markets  to  substitute 
Persian  for  Indian  opium  in  the  trade  covered  by  import  and  export 
certificates.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  indication  that  Persian 
merchants  have  relinquished  the  trade  they  formerly  plied  in  ship- 
ments of  opium  not  sanctioned  by  the  terms  of  the  Hague  Convention. 

This  apparent  increase  in  Persian  opium  exports  at  a time  when 
international  efforts  are  being  directed  toward  their  drastic  diminu- 
tion is  one  of  the  circumstances  which  has  caused  the  Chairman  of  the 
Advisory  Committee  to  regard  the  undertakings  of  the  Persian 
Government  with  a restrained  optimism.  This,  too,  is  one  of  the 
circumstances  which  has  caused  restraint  rather  than  optimism  to 
characterize  the  tenth  official  report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  to 
the  League  Council  in  October,  1927. 

Thus  as  the  year  1928  advances,  it  appears  not  unlikely  to  Geneva 
observers  that  substantial  obstacles  may  still  continue  to  block  the 
path  to  Persia’s  complete  acceptance  of  the  import  and  export 
certificate  system.  If  such  proves  to  be  the  case,  it  may  well  happen 
that  Geneva  will  look  back  upon  the  year  1927  as  an  incident,  but 
scarcely  as  a turning-point,  in  the  progress  of  Persia  toward  com- 
plete cooperation  in  international  control  of  the  traffic  in  opium. 


38 


ANNEX  I 

PERSIAN  POLICY  OF  OPIUM  RESTRICTION 

Extract  from  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium  submitted  by  Persian 
Delegation  to  Second  Opium  Conference  at  Geneva,  November,  1924.* 

General  Policy 

The  Persian  Government  is  in  full  accord  and  sympathy  with  the 
efforts  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  eradicate  the  illicit  trade  in  dangerous 
drugs,  which  offers  so  great  a menace  to  the  health  and  welfare  of  the 
peoples  of  the  world.  It  accepts  the  American  principles  for  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  Opium  Convention  and  will  withdraw  its  reservation  to 
Article  3 of  the  Treaty  of  1912  and  accept  the  system  of  opium  import 
certificates  as  soon  as  it  is  economically  possible  to  do  so. 

Unconditional  Assurances 

1.  The  regulations  relative  to  the  centralisation  of  the  opium  sap  and 
its  manipulation  under  the  Government’s  supervision  will  be  strictly 
enforced  and  constantly  rendered  more  effective. 

2.  Steps  will  be  taken  to  register  smokers,  to  cure  present  and  to 
prevent  new  addicts,  to  control  opium  dens,  and  otherwise  to  bring  under 
control  and  to  reduce  the  present  consumption  of  opium  and  its  deriva- 
tives in  the  Empire. 

3.  Control,  as  far  as  funds  permit,  will  be  exercised  at  the  frontiers 
to  prevent  opium  being  smuggled  into  or  out  of  the  country. 

4.  The  policy  as  to  opium  cultivation  will  be  as  follows : 

(a)  Opium  cultivation  will  hereafter  be  permitted  only  upon 
permit ; 

(b)  No  cultivation  will  be  permitted  on  a greater  area  than 
stated  in  the  permit; 

(c)  No  permit  to  be  issued  to  cultivators  for  land  not  cultivated 
in  1924,  or  for  a greater  area  in  the  case  of  any  individual  than 
cultivated  in  1924; 

(d)  No  permits  to  be  issued  except  to  cultivators  who  agree 
to  deliver  entire  crop  to  Government  warehouses ; 

(e)  Efforts  to  be  made  to  immediately  reduce  the  cultivation 
in  provinces  least  dependent  on  opium  for  their  cash  crops ; 

(f)  Cultivation  to  be  confined  as  far  as  practicable  to  provinces 
where  the  best  grades  are  grown  and  where  the  product  can  be 
most  easily  controlled; 

(g)  The  tax  on  the  local  consumption  of  opium  to  be  progres- 
sively increased  as  provided  in  the  law. 

5.  The  importation  of  opium  for  re-export  to  countries  to  which  it 
cannot  be  shipped  from  country  of  origin,  will  be  prohibited. 

6.  Beginning  with  the  present  year,  a careful  record  will  be  kept  of 

•See  League  of  Nations.  Records  of  the  Second  Opium  Conference,  Geneva,  Nov.  17,  1924- 
Feb.  19,  192B,  Vol.  11.  p.  2D1-2. 


39 


opium  cultivation  in  all  provinces.  This,  taken  in  connection  with  records 
and  estimates  of  local  consumption  and  customs  records  of  exports,  will 
afford  a fair  basis  for  estimate  of  that  smuggled  out  of  the  country  and 
enable  the  necessary  preventive  measures  being  taken. 

7.  As  far  as  funds  permit,  the  Government  will  continue  its  present 
encouragement  to  the  cultivation  of  cotton  and  tobacco  and  to  the  plant- 
ing of  mulberry  trees.  As  these  and  similar  measures  produce  results, 
the  cultivation  of  opium  will  be  proportionally  reduced,  but  it  must  be 
understood  that,  with  the  limited  funds  available,  this  will  be  a slow 
process. 

Conditional  Assurances 

The  following  measures  will  be  placed  in  effect  as  soon  as  the  neces- 
sary funds  and  technical  assistants  are  obtained  to  afford  another  outlet 
for  the  capital  and  labour  employed  in  the  opium  trade,  and  to  provide 
new  revenue  sources  for  the  Government  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of 
opium  revenues : 

1.  An  annual  reduction  in  the  permits  issued  to  the  amount  of  one- 
tenth  of  the  total  area  authorised  for  cultivation  in  the  year  in  which 
the  above  conditions  are  met.  This  annual  reduction  to  continue,  until 
production  has  been  reduced  to  actual  requirements  for  medicinal  and 
scientific  purposes. 

2.  Within  three  years  after  the  above  conditions  are  met,  the  cultiva- 
tion of  opium  will  be  prohibited  in  the  provinces  least  dependent  upon  it 
in  so  far  as  the  then  existing  conditions  permit. 

3.  After  the  cultivation  has  been  reduced  as  above  provided  to  the 
amount  required  for  medicinal  and  scientific  purposes  the  Persian  Gov- 
ernment can  successfully  enforce  the  provisions  of  Article  3 of  the 
Opium  Convention  of  1912  and  its  reservation  thereto  will  then  be  with- 
drawn and  the  system  of  opium  import  certificates  placed  in  effect. 

ANNEX  II 

CHAIRMAN’S  PERSONAL  SUMMARY  OF  FINDINGS  OF 
LEAGUE  COMMISSION  OF  ENQUIRY 

Extract  from  a letter  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  signed  by 

Frederic  A.  Delano. 

THE  FINDINGS 

1.  Persia  was  once  the  centre  of  the  then-known  civilised  world,  and 
the  chief  trade  routes  to  the  Far  East  lay  across  it.  To-day  it  is  off  the 
main  trade  routes  and,  at  least  relatively  speaking,  is  far  more  inaccessible 
than  formerly. 

2.  North  and  North-West  Persia  have,  under  normal  conditions,  easy 
and  close  trade  relations  with  Russia,  Iraq  (Mesopotamia),  and  with 
Turkey;  while  North-East  Persia  has  close  trade  relations  with  Russian 
Transcaucasia,  Russian  Turkestan  and  Afghanistan;  and  South  Persia 
close  trade  relations  with  Great  Britain,  with  Iraq  and  with  India. 


40 


3.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  good  means  of  communications  either  by  land 
or  sea,  internal  commerce  is  greatly  restricted,  and  foreign  commerce 
exists,  broadly  speaking,  only  with  cities  near  the  frontier.  (The  report 
shows  that  the  transport  charges  on  goods  moved  chiefly  by  caravan,  re- 
duced to  our  nomenclature,  amount  to  from  18  to  35  cents  per  ton  mile.) 

4.  While  it  is  probably  true  that  Persia’s  undeveloped  and  undiscov- 
ered resources  are  large,  the  Persian  people  as  a whole  are  poor — ^very 
poor ; and  this  is  due  to  economic  conditions  which  have  in  the  last  hundred 
years  been  driving  her  to  the  wall.  During  a considerable  part  of  this 
time,  Persia’s  trade  balance  has  been  against  her,  and  the  deficit  has  been 
in  part  represented  by  debt,  but  more  often  in  the  depletion  of  her  capi- 
tal, in  her  case  of  those  savings  of  the  past  in  the  form  of  rare  art  treas- 
ures, beautiful  fabrics,  tiles,  miniatures,  and  the  like,  which,  to  a con- 
stantly increasing  extent,  have  gone  out  of  Persia  and  have  found  their 
way  into  the  collections  of  Europe  and  America. 

5.  By  reason  of  famine,  disease,  civil  wars,  the  causes  of  which  may 
be  traced  largely  to  bad  economic  conditions,  the  population  of  the  coun- 
try has  greatly  diminished  in  the  last  fifty  or  sixty  years,  and  is  today, 
let  us  say,  not  in  excess  of  one-third  or  one-fourth  of  what  the  country 
under  more  ideal  economic  conditions  might  support. 

6.  Persia,  being  a country  of  very  scanty  rainfall  (estimated  at  from 
two  to  twelve  inches  per  year),  except  in  the  north-western  region  and 
the  Caspian  Littoral: 

(a)  The  cities  and  towns  are  located  at  the  foothills  where  water 
from  the  melting  snow  is  available; 

(b)  Broadly  speaking,  one-third  of  the  country  is  a desert,  an- 
other one-third  is  mountainous  and  chiefly  suitable  for  grazing; 

(c)  The  cities  are  far  apart,  and  as  the  means  of  communication 
are  poor,  each  city  is  a small  empiie  by  itself,  only  feebly  connected 
with  the  capital ; 

(d)  Agriculture  is  chiefly  dependent  on  irrigation,  which  de- 
mands intelligent  and  industrious  labor,  but  that  does  not  permit 
Persia  to  compete  in  the  production  of  raw  materials  with  those 
countries  having  an  abundant  rainfall.  In  addition,  Persia  is  at  a 
disadvantage  of  distance  and  high  transport  costs  in  reaching  world 
markets. 

7.  The  Caspian  Littoral  and  the  Karun  Valley,  lying  adjacent  to  the 
Mesopotamian  Plain,  are  to  a considerable  extent  an  exception  to  the 
above  comments. 

8.  There  is  a lack  of  security  in  Persia  which  accounts  to  a consider- 
able extent  for  what  is  frequently  termed  by  foreigners  a lack  of  initiative 
or  public  spirit.  For  example,  the  Commission  found  no  disposition  to 
store  grains  (e.  g.  in  ground  silos)  in  abundant  years  to  carry  over  to 
lean  years.  The  reason  given  was  lack  of  confidence  in  the  security,  the 
high  rates  of  money,  the  want  of  adequate  protection  of  private  property. 

41 


9.  Land  titles  in  the  same  way  are  indefinite  and  insecure.  There  is 
no  such  thing  as  a land  survey,  or  as  the  registration  of  titles.  Some- 
thing approaching  it  exists  through  the  Church  authorities. 

10.  Opium  poppy  is  an  ideal  crop  from  several  points  of  view,  but 
chiefly  because : 

(a)  It  is  an  autumn-sown  crop  which  can  be  irrigated  in  the  late 
fall  and  early  spring  when  water  is  plentiful.  It  is  harvested  in  the 
late  spring  or  early  summer ; 

(b)  It  has  a high  value  per  pound  and  money  yield  per  acre,  say, 
four  times  that  of  wheat  and  barley,  which  are  also  fall-sown  crops ; 

(c)  Its  high  value  per  pound  (say,  $6  to  $8)  is  such  that  it  can 
bear  the  terrifically  high  transport  charges  prevalent  in  that  country ; 

(d)  Being  largely  exported,  it  helps  Persia  to  pay  for  imports, 
but  it  is  not  by  any  means  certain  that  Persia  would  not  be  better  off 
if  she  did  not  buy  so  largely  abroad. 

11.  A number  of  industries  for  which  Persia  was  once  famous  are 
dying  out  and  Persia,  instead  of  exporting  only  manufactured  goods  hav- 
ing high  value  (and  so  able  to  bear  a high  transport  charge),  is  attempting 
to  export  raw  material,  such,  for  example,  as  wool,  cotton  (of  inferior 
grade),  rice,  etc. 

12.  The  industries  which  are  dying  out  and  which  might  be  restored, 
are  the  production  of  : 

(a)  Silk,  wool  and  cotton  fabrics; 

(b)  Pottery,  tiles,  earthenware,  bricks; 

(c)  Artistic  metal-work; 

(d)  Woodcarving,  inlaying,  etc.; 

(e)  Painting  miniatures,  decorating,  engrossing  parchment,  etc.; 

(f)  Sheep,  lamb  and  goat  skins,  hides,  leather  goods. 

13.  In  addition  to  the  industries  which  are  dying  out  and  which  may 
again  be  put  upon  their  feet,  certain  other  industries  can  be  developed, 
for  example: 

(a)  Those  dependent  on  the  development  of  mineral  oil,  of 
which  there  is  very  evidently  an  abundance ; 

(b)  Vegetable  oils  from  oil  seed,  such  as  rape  seed,  peanut  oil, 
castor  oil,  soya  beans,  etc. ; 

(c)  Making  and  distributing  dried  fruits,  preserves,  etc.; 

(d)  Making  sugar,  especially  from  sugar  cane; 

(e)  Plaster  of  paris  (gypsum),  lime  and  cement. 

14.  The  Commission  noted  that  the  methods  of  agriculture  were  very 
primitive,  but  remarked  that  it  does  not  follow  therefrom  that  the  farm 
implements  and  tools  of  Western  Europe  and  America  can  be  applied  to 
Persian  conditions,  which  are  very  different  from  those  of  Europe.  The 
Commission  fully  appreciated  the  great  difficulties  in  the  way  of  intro- 
ducing new  methods  of  cultivation  and  crops. 

42 


CONCLUSIONS  OF  THE  COMMISSION 


It  is  apparent  from  the  above  facts : 

1.  That  Persia  is  suffering  seriously  from  wretchedly  inadequate 
means  of  internal  communication;  that  this  puts  a very  heavy  tax  upon 
commerce  within  the  country  itself.  It  is  often  far  cheaper  for  a city 
close  to  the  frontier  to  purchase  from  foreign  countries  raw  materials 
or  manufactured  products  which  are  produced  or  might  be  produced  in 
Persia.  The  need  of  improved  means  of  communication,  chiefly  roads  for 
wheeled  vehicles,  is  clearly  indicated,  though  there  is  also  an  argument, 
supported  not  solely  on  economic  grounds,  but  also  by  strong  political 
and  military  reasons,  for  building  a railroad  from  the  capital  to  a port  on 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

2.  Improved  agricultural  methods,  adapted  to  intensive  agriculture  and 
horticulture,  because  the  country  is  so  dependent  on  irrigation,  were 
urged  by  the  Commission.  Without  increasing  the  acreage  under  cultiva- 
tion, or  the  water  consumed  in  irrigation,  a greater  product,  or  a product 
of  greater  value  per  acre,  was  believed  to  be  possible. 

3.  A careful  study  of  the  water  resources,  with  a view  not  only  of 
conserving  the  water  supply,  but  of  securing  it  more  efficiently  and  econ- 
omically, was  suggested.  The  use  of  artesian  wells,  oil  pumps,  and  wind- 
mills, was  suggested  as  promising. 

4.  The  need  of  cheap  combustibles  is  great  on  account  of  the  bearing 
that  it  will  have  on  various  industries,  some  of  them  ancient  industries 
which  are  dying  out ; also  because  a cheap  combustible  such  as  fuel  oil  or 
coal  would  stay  the  destruction  of  the  forests  and  enable  the  gradual  re- 
forestation of  the  country,  which  is  now  sadly  denuded.  This  has  had  an 
important  effect  in  the  destruction  of  soil  through  erosion,  as  well  as  by 
its  indirect  effect  on  climate. 

5.  A revival  of  the  dying  industries,  and  the  protection  of  Persia 
against  economic  pressure  of  countries  already  highly  industrialised,  can 
only  be  brought  about  by  a protective  tariff.  It  may  or  may  not  be  de- 
sirable for  Persia  to  adopt  the  industrial  methods  of  Western  Europe  and 
America  (and  on  this  point  the  Commission  does  not  express  an  opinion), 
but,  whether  or  not  it  is  desirable,  the  country  needs  protection  during  the 
period  of  adjustment,  which,  even  under  favourable  conditions,  would  take 
a considerable  number  of  years  to  bring  about. 

6.  The  production  of  opium  exists  largely  by  reason  of  the  economic 
conditions  aforesaid.  The  Persian  Government  has  indicated  by  its  own 
actions,  and  by  its  efforts  to  prevent  the  consumption  of  opium  at  home 
(it  is  absolutely  forbidden  in  the  Government  service  or  in  the  army), 
that  it  considers  the  use  of  opium  a serious  menace.  The  Commission 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  even  a more  serious  menace  than  was 
usually  appreciated;  that  it  was  slowly  but  surely  destroying  the  man- 
power of  the  country ; that  it  was  impossible  to  produce  opium  for  export 
and  not  have  it  also  consumed  in  considerable  quantities  at  home. 

43 


ANNEX  III 


DIMINUTION  OF  OPIUM  CULTIVATION  IN  PERSIA 

Extract  from  Report  of  League  Commission  of  Enquiry  into  the 
Production  of  Opium  in  Persia,  December,  1926. 

Conclusions  and  Recommendations 

From  the  study  of  the  evidence  submitted  to  it  and  the  personal  in- 
vestigations it  has  conducted,  the  Commission,  in  response  to  the  specific 
lines  of  enquiry  it  was  required  to  make,  begs  leave  to  report ; 

1.  That  it  has  diligently  and  carefully  studied  the  existing  situation  with 
regard  to  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy  in  Persia,  and  that  it  has  endeavoured, 
in  the  report  now  submitted,  fully  to  present  and  explain  that  situation. 

2.  That  it  has  investigated  as  carefully  as  possible  the  question  of  the 
replacement  of  a portion  of  this  cultivation  by  other  crops,  and  in  doing  so 
has  presented  in  the  report  now  submitted  what  it  believes  may  success- 
fully be  accomplished,  given  adequate  time;  (a)  by  the  substitution  of 
“other  crops”;  (b)  by  better  methods  of  cultivation,  which  will  result  in 
greater  yields  from  existing  crops;  and  (c)  by  the  creation  of  industries 
which  will  make  the  cultivation  of  new  crops  possible. 

Finally,  it  has  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that,  while  difficult  of  ac- 
complishment, it  is  possible  and  practically  feasible,  and  to  the  economic 
interest  of  Persia,  to  adopt  a programme  for  the  gradual  diminution  of 
the  cultivation  of  the  opium  poppy,  and,  in  this  connection,  is  glad  to 
call  attention  to  the  formal  letter  of  the  Persian  Government  addressed 
to  the  President  of  the  Commission  under  date  of  Teheran,  June  1st, 
1926,  in  which  it  is  stated  categorically  that  the  Persian  Government  has 
the  intention  of  gradually  reducing  the  production  of  opium  to  medical 
needs. ^ 

Having  arrived  at  the  above  conclusions,  the  Commission  begs  leave 
to  submit  in  review  its  various  findings  in  the  form  of  a summary  of 
what  has  been  stated  more  fully  in  the  body  of  the  report. 

In  view  of  the  explanations  made  by  the  Persian  Government,  we  must 
consider  in  order  the  various  suggestions  it  has  made  and  the  obstacles 
which,  in  its  opinion,  exist.  These  are,  first,  budgetary ; second,  export 
importance  and  trade  balance;  and,  third,  cash  yield  of  crop  to  the 
producer. 

Budget.  In  round  figures,  the  national  income  from  taxes  and  charges 
against  opium  amount  to  2,000,000  tomans  per  year,  which  is  estimated 
at  about  20  per  cent  of  the  gross  value  of  the  crop  and  approximately 
8 per  cent  of  the  total  revenue  to  the  State,  against  which  must  be  charged 
cost  of  control,  cost  of  alimentation  and  other  less  definite  items.  When 
all  the  factors  are  taken  into  account,  the  Commission  believes  that, 

1.  “It  is  our  conviction  that  the  production  ot  opium  can  be  curtailed.  . . . Nevertheless, 
the  Persian  Government  will  take  immediate  measures  to  reduce  the  production  of  opium 
to  medicinal  requirements  and  will  prosecute  these  measures  as  rapidly  as  circumstances  per- 
mit. The  Government  is  likewise  determined  to  put  a stop  to  the  smoking  of  opium  within 
the  country  as  rapidly  as  possible.”  (Extract  from  letter  from  Persian  Prime  Minister  to 
President  of  the  Commission  dated  June  1st,  1926.) 

44 


viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  its  budget,  the  Government  can  safely 
undertake  a reasonable  programme  of  progressive  curtailment. 

Balance  of  trade.  The  trade  balance  has  been  considered  by  the 
Commission  both  from  the  commercial  and  the  economic  viewpoint, 
calling  attention  particularly  to  the  recent  great  increase  in  the  export 
of  mineral  oil  and  the  method  adopted  by  the  State  in  dealing  with  this 
subject.  The  point  is  also  made  that  in  the  last  fifty  years  there  has 
been  an  almost  steady  increase  in  the  importation  of  manufactured  articles 
and  a diminution  of  production  of  manufactures  for  home  consumption. 
The  effect  until  recent  years  has  been  to  create  an  unfavourable  trade 
balance  during  a large  portion  of  this  period,  reflected  in  national  debt 
and  impoverishment.  The  Commission  believes  that  even  if  we  accept 
the  Government’s  method  of  treating  the  subject  of  oil  exports,  a pro- 
gramme of  substitution,  based  on  a development  of  agricultural  methods, 
will  enable  the  country  to  secure  from  food  crops,  from  textiles,  from 
sugar,  and  from  correlative  industries  more  than  enough  to  balance 
losses  in  exports.  As  fully  explained,  this  is  a matter  of  time. 

Cash  crop.  The  investigations  of  the  Commission  indicate  that  the 
cash  yield  per  unit  from  the  production  of  poppy  to  the  cultivator  is 
about  four  times  the  yield  from  the  growing  of  wheat.  Against  this 
apparent  advantage  in  the  case  of  poppy  there  must  be  considered  the 
various  items  of  direct  and  indirect  cost.  The  Commission  is  convinced 
that  with  better  agricultural  methods  the  production  of  various  crops 
could  be  increased  sufficiently  on  the  same  area  of  ground  fully  to  equal 
the  loss  due  from  restricting  the  production  of  the  poppy.  Of  course, 
nobody  proposes  that  the  suppression  of  the  poppy  crop  will  be  effected 
except  on  some  gradual  and  perfectly  practical  plan. 

Transport.  The  great  importance  of  transport  and  means  of  com- 
munication in  the  development  of  Persian  agriculture  and  other  industries 
and  in  opening  up  marketing  possibilities,  not  to  mention  its  importance 
from  a military  and  political  standpoint,  is  fully  exposed. 

We  now  come  to  other  but  allied  considerations : namely,  the  effect 
which  these  proposals  may  have  upon  the  peasant,  the  landowner  and 
the  merchant. 

Peasant.  The  findings  of  the  Commission  indicate  that  the  peasant 
is  deserving  of  more  than  ordinary  consideration  on  account  of  his 
general  character  and  capacity  for  development;  that  the  growing  of  the 
poppy  is  closely  associated  with  a work  system  which  is  degrading  and 
that  in  districts  where  more  emphasis  is  put  upon  food  crops  the  peasants 
are  in  better  condition  and  are  decidedly  more  prosperous. 

Landowners.  The  landowners,  especially  the  larger  landowners  and 
those  who  are  themselves  opium  merchants  or  associated  with  opium 
merchants,  fare  pretty  well  in  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy,  and  yet  it 
is  strongly  indicated  that  the  cultivation  and  sale  of  the  crop  is  attended 
with  considerable  hazard  and  not  as  uniformly  profitable  as  generally 

45 


supposed.  While  the  immediate  effect  of  limiting  the  poppy  culture 
might  be  detrimental  to  the  proprietor,  it  is  the  belief  of  the  Commission 
that  more  intensive  agricultural  methods  will,  because  they  will  benefit 
the  country,  benefit  the  landowners. 

Merchants.  The  opium  merchants,  and  particularly  the  larger  mer- 
chants, appear  to  the  Commission  to  be  those  whose  interests  are  most 
strongly  opposed  to  any  change  of  the  present  cultivation.  They  may 
be  assumed  to  be  solidly  against  it. 

General  economic  effects  of  substitution.  The  effects  of  substitution 
on  the  general  economics  of  Persia  have  been  fully  discussed  under  the 
following  headings : 

(a)  Substitute  Crops:  Food  and  Other  Crops. 

Persia  has  need  in  her  own  domestic  economy  for  more  of  these  crops 
than  are  now  produced.  The  Commission  believes  that  their  cultivation 
should  be  increased  and  that  economy  will  result  from  more  intensive 
cultivation  without  increased  acreage. 

(b)  Industries. 

The  Commission  has  pointed  out  a number  of  industries  closely  as- 
sociated with  various  products  of  the  land  and  the  soil,  the  existence  and 
encouragement  of  which  should  increase  the  national  wealth.  These 
are;  the  textile  industry  (silk,  cotton  and  wool),  the  carpet  industry, 
sugar  (especially  cane  sugar),  the  dried  and  preserved  fruits  industry, 
the  lime  and  cement  industry  and  the  clay  products  industry.  Several 
of  these  industries  have  suffered  in  the  past  for  want  of  a cheap  fuel. 
The  great  expansion  of  the  oil  industry  has  opened  the  possibility  of  fuel 
oil  as  a most  important  item  in  this  development. 

Preparation  of  a programme.  The  Commission  considers  that,  instead 
of  attempting  to  reduce  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy)  immediately,  the 
Persian  Government  should  make  it  an  essential  part  of  its  programme 
to  take  definite  steps  looking  to  and  preparatory  for  a gradual  and 
systematic  reduction,  to  begin  three  years  from  the  promulgation  of  that 
programme.  Among  the  most  difficult  of  the  questions  involved  are, 
naturally,  those  connected  with  the  control  of  poppy  cultivation. 

The  Commission  has  envisaged  in  its  report  certain  suggestions  for 
registration  and  licensing  of  acreage  devoted  to  the  growing  of  the  poppy. 

The  registration  and  licensing  of,  and  the  requirement  of  a surety  bond 
from,  all  merchants  authorised  to  buy  and  sell  opium  are  also  indicated. 

The  Commission  suggests  that  the  Persian  Government  should  consider 
the  advisability  of  revising  its  export  and  excise  taxes  on  opium  with  a 
view  to  reducing  the  wide  disparity  and  yet  securing  a larger  total  yield. 

Lastly,  the  adoption  of  identifying  marks  on  all  opium  produced  and 
sold  is  also  proposed. 

Recognising  the  difficulty  due  to  the  widely  scattered  nature  of  the 
cultivation  and  the  difference  of  conditions  that  exist,  the  Commission 
believes  it  may  also  be  necessary  to  allow  one  year,  or  perhaps  even  two, 

46 


for  carrying  out  experiments  in  different  sections  of  the  country  in  order 
to  determine  how  the  programme  of  retrenchment  of  acreage  shall  be 
made  effective.  On  the  face  of  it,  it  is  evident  that  substitution  can  more 
readily  be  made  in  certain  regions  than  in  others.  Where  better  facilities 
of  transport  exist,  or  in  the  neighbourhood  of  large  towns,  things  can  be 
done  which  cannot  be  done  in  less-favoured  regions. 

General  programme  of  reduction.  At  the  end  of  this  preparatory 
period  of  three  years  it  is  proposed  to  proceed  with  the  following  general 
programme ; 

(a)  Continue  the  road  programme  on  as  big  a scale  as  budgetary 
expenditure  will  permit,  including  in  this  programme  the  initial 
development  of  a railway  system; 

(b)  Allot  to  the  most  promising  irrigation  project  enough  to 
undertake  it  and  complete  it  in  one,  two  or  three  years ; 

(c)  Develop  the  farm  demonstration  work  heretofore  under- 
taken, emphasizing  the  practical  rather  than  the  theoretical  side ; 

(d)  Adopt  a system  of  tariffs,  which  shall  encourage  those 
home  industries  which  Persia  can  undertake  most  successfully  and 
which,  by  reducing  imports,  will  help  the  balance  of  trade ; 

(e)  Simultaneously  with  the  announcement  of  these  internal 
undertakings,  the  Government  shall  formulate  a programme  for  the 
gradual  reduction  of  the  acreage  allocated  to  the  opium  poppy.  With 
all  the  land  so  devoted  properly  registered,  a systematic  reduction 
can  be  undertaken,  which  can  be  so  handled  as  to  make  the  reduc- 
tion first  in  those  localities  where  substitute  crops  or  industries  are 
most  possible. 

The  Commission  believes  that,  beginning  with  the  fourth  year,  the 
Persian  Government  might  safely  undertake  a reduction  of  10  per  cent 
per  year  in  the  acreage  allotted,  and  each  year  thereafter  a further 
reduction  of  10  per  cent  of  what  remains.  This  method  of  reduction 
will  operate  more  rapidly  at  the  start  and  more  gradually  thereafter, 
as  follows : 

Beginning  of 


4th 

Sth 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

year 

year 

year 

year 

year 

year 

year 

Percentage  at  beginning.... 

. too 

90 

81 

72.9 

65.6 

59 

53.1 

Reduction  

10 

9 

8.1 

7.3 

6.6 

5.9 

5.3 

90 

81 

72.9 

65.6 

59.0 

53.1 

47.8 

As  this  method  of  reduction  becomes  more  and  more  gradual,  the 
acreage  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  year  is  reduced  to  28.2  per  cent  and 
in  the  twentieth  year  to  16.7  per  cent.  Before  that  time,  Persia  will 
have  determined  her  policy  of  substituting  other  crops  and  industries. 

The  Commission  fully  appreciates  the  importance  of  not  curtailing  a 
crop  yielding  approximately  8 per  cent  of  Persia’s  tax  revenues  and 
16  per  cent  in  value  of  her  gross  exports  without  suggesting  as  a 
proposal  measures  which  will  effectively  offset  the  curtailments  proposed. 

47 


During  the  first  three  years — the  years  of  preparation — the  Commis- 
sion believes  that  the  revenues  from  the  various  opium  taxes  and  from 
a more  effective  control  of  tax  collection  can  be  increased  not  less  than 
1,000,000  tomans  per  year. 

It  is  assumed  that,  as  the  means  of  communication  are  improved  and 
progress  is  made  in  encouraging  the  production  of  more  and  better  cotton 
and  the  introduction  of  cotton-spinning  and  weaving  machinery,  there 
will  be  a corresponding  reduction  in  the  import  of  cotton  piece-goods. 
While  progress  should  be  made  in  this  direction,  it  is  assumed  that  only 
the  foundation  work  can  be  accomplished  in  the  first  three  years.  This 
programme  of  building  up  the  cotton  textile  industry  in  Persia  must 
necessarily  include  the  placing  of  a protective  tariff  on  cotton  yams  and 
piece-goods. 

Similar  plans,  in  so  far  as  practical,  will  be  employed  in  an  effort  to 
develop  the  wool  and  silk  industries. 

Special  study  and  consideration  must  be  given  also  to  sugar-beet  and 
sugar-cane,  with  a view  to  their  development  and  the  fabrication  of  raw 
sugar.  While  it  will  take  all  of  the  three  years  of  preparation  to  make 
a substantial  progress  in  carrying  out  these  suggestions,  it  is  believed 
that  by  the  fourth  year  the  production  of  home-grown  sugar  will  begin 
to  have  an  effect  in  balancing  foreign  trade,  because  sugar  is  now  the 
second  most  important  subject  of  import. 

There  are  certain  other  taxes  on  imports  which  may  be  raised  to  ad- 
vantage, especially  where  a tariff  for  revenue  may  also  aid  in  the 
establishment  or  the  re-establishment  of  a home  industry. 

It  is  assumed  that,  for  a period  of  five  years,  there  will  be  no  diminu- 
tion in  the  receipts  from  the  various  taxes  and  license  fees  on  opium 
and  that  in  the  first  three  years  of  this  period  there  will  be  the  substantial 
increase  of  1,000,000  tomans  per  year.  A further  sum  of  1,000,000 
tomans  per  year  should  be  realisable  from  other  sources. 

These  increases  in  receipts  it  is  proposed  to  apply  to  carrying  out  the 
programme  suggested  by  the  Commission. 

It  is  not  possible  to  predict  accurately  receipts  and  expenses  for 
several  years  in  advance,  and  the  above  suggestions  are  therefore  simply 
illustrative. 

Presumably,  as  the  means  of  communication  improve,  the  necessity  for 
the  present  relatively  high  expenditure  upon  the  army  and  gendarmerie 
can  be  safely  diminished  and  the  money  so  saved  used  for  productive 
expenditure  and  internal  improvements.  The  same  may  also  be  said  of 
the  very  large  expenditure  now  devoted  almost  yearly  to  the  Alimentation 
Service. 

The  Commission  fully  realises  that  the  execution  of  so  large  an  under- 
taking as  here  discussed  necessarily  involves  questions  of  internal  ad- 
ministration, which  only  the  Persian  Government  can  determine.  For 
the  foregoing  reason,  and  for  the  further  fact  that  the  terms  of  its 
mandate  clearly  indicate  that  this  phase  of  the  subject  is  beyond  its  scope, 
these  questions  are  not  discussed. 


48 


OBSERVATIONS  OF  THE  PERSIAN  GOVERNMENT  ON  THE 
REPORT  BY  THE  LEAGUE  COMMISSION  OF  ENQUIRY 

Extracts  from  a communication  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  March  4,  1927* 

GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 

Narcotic  Control 

In  narcotic  control  the  chief  aim,  it  would  seem,  is  the  elimination  of 
the  illicit  trade  in  habit-forming  drugs.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  call 
attention  to  the  insignificant  part  taken  by  Persian  opium  in  this  traffic. 
The  statistics  compiled  by  the  Opium  Section  of  the  League  of  Nations 
indicate  that,  if  the  entire  opium  production  of  Persia  were  suppressed, 
the  effect  on  drug  manufacture  would  be  practically  negligible,  since  the 
opium  used  in  the  manufacture  of  narcotic  drugs  is  furnished  almost  en- 
tirely by  other  countries. 

Plan  for  Reduction 

The  plan  for  reduction  proposed  by  the  Commission  does  not  appear 
to  take  into  consideration  the  legitimate  demands  for  opium,  and  no  sug- 
gestion appears  to  have  been  made  by  the  Commission  with  reference  to 
the  relation  that  the  proposed  reduction  in  Persian  cultivation  should  bear 
to  the  reduction  in  other  opium-producing  countries,  all  of  which  have 
better  transportation  facilities,  better  water  supply,  and  better  access  to 
markets  for  their  products.  If  the  hoped-for  reduction  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  narcotic  drugs  and  in  the  production  of  their  raw  material  is  to 
be  attained,  it  would  appear  desirable  that  the  reduction  considered  nec- 
essary should  be  made  effective  about  the  same  time  in  all  the  producing 
and  manufacturing  countries. 

If,  however,  there  is  to  be  a curtailment  in  opium  production,  a start 
must  be  made,  and  the  Persian  Government  proposes  to  submit  a pro- 
gramme of  reduction  to  the  Majliss  without  attending  the  prior  ac- 
ceptance of  a similar  programme  on  the  part  of  other  producing  or  man- 
ufacturing countries. 

Time  and  Cost  of  Substitution 

The  Commission  has  envisaged  the  problem  of  substitution  in  its  gen- 
eral rather  than  its  particular  aspects.  For  an  eventual  solution  this  is 
undoubtedly  correct,  but  the  opium  question  is  one  that  is  pressing,  not 
only  for  Persia,  but  for  the  whole  world.  It  is  obvious  that,  given  time 
and  good  will,  the  production  of  the  raw  material  of  narcotic  drugs  and 
their  manufacture  can  be  reduced  everywhere  to  medicinal  requirements. 
But  with  the  rapid  increase  in  drug  addiction,  time  does  not  permit  of  solu- 
tions depending  on  the  general  acceptance  of  a moral  conception  and  upon 
gradual  improvements  in  economic  conditions  for  their  realisation.  So- 

•Letter  of  March  4.  1927.  from  M.  G.  Kemal  Hedayat  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League. 

49 


lutions  which  will  give  prompt  results  are  necesary,  and  for  such  solu- 
tions not  general  but  specific  measures  must  be  proposed.  Specific  meas- 
ures require  specific  supporting  data  as  to  time  and  cost. 

It  will  therefore  be  obvious  that  the  time  required  and  the  cost  of  sub- 
stitution are  questions  of  first  importance.  The  Commission  has  not 
found  it  possible  to  submit  definite  estimates  as  to  these  factors.  It  is, 
however,  clear  that,  for  each  of  the  important  crop  substitutes,  several 
years’  preparatory  work  will  be  necessary  to  enable  seed  selection,  dem- 
onstration and  improvement  in  quality  and  for  the  organization  of  the 
trade.  A period  of  years  will  also  be  required  for  the  provision  of  the 
additional  water  required,  and  for  the  road  and  railroad  construction 
which  is  necessary. 

Finance 

For  the  financing  of  the  suggested  programme  of  reduction,  the  Com- 
mission suggests  that  one  million  tomans^  per  annum  be  realised  from 
increased  opium  revenues  and  one  million  tomans  from  other  sources. 
The  increase  in  opium  revenues  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  a certainty. 
There  may  be  a loss  if  the  acreage  tax  is  put  into  effect,  even  if,  as  pro- 
posed, the  export  duties  are  increased.  The  Commission  does  not  indicate 
the  revenue  sources  from  which  the  second  million  tomans  is  to  be  derived. 
Even  if  the  Government  succeeds  in  obtaining  the  desired  revenue  in- 
creases, it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  in  addition  to  the  expenses  inci- 
dent to  opium  curtailment,  there  are  other  important  and  pressing  de- 
mands upon  the  country’s  budget  which  cannot  be  indefinitely  postponed. 

Action  Proposed  by  the  Government 

In  view  of  the  evident  difficulty  of  estimating  precisely  in  advance 
either  the  cost  or  the  time  required  for  the  introduction  of  substitute 
crops,  the  provision  of  the  necessary  water  and  transport  facilities,  and 
the  creation  of  new  industries,  it  would  not  be  possible  at  this  time  for 
the  Government  to  ask  the  Parliament  to  approve  an  unconditional  pro- 
gramme of  reduction.  The  three  years’  preparatory  interval  suggested 
by  the  Commission  seems  to  be  very  short  in  comparison  with  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  task  to  be  undertaken.  The  Government,  however,  accepts 
to  include  it  in  the  programme  to  be  submitted  to  the  Majliss  and  hopes 
that  it  will  prove  adequate  for  the  enactment  of  the  requisite  legislation 
and  for  the  initiation  of  the  constructive  measures  necessary  to  enable  the 
realisation  of  the  programme  of  opium  substitution  recommended  by  the 
Commission. 

In  view  of  the  necessity  for  a successful  outcome  to  the  proposed  prac- 
tical test  of  production  curtailment,  we  are  confident  that  Persia  will  not 
be  expected  to  undertake  a programme  which  would  in  practice  be  in- 
effective or  which  would  unnecessarily  discriminate  against  the  economic 
interests  of  the  country.  If  the  economic  condition  and  likewise  the 

1.  One  toman  or  ten  krans  may  be  considered  as  approximately  $1  U.  S.  A. 

50 


geographic  and  commercial  situation  of  Persia  are  taken  into  considera- 
tion, it  will  be  agreed  that,  in  reducing  the  cultivation  of  opium,  Persia 
should  enjoy  a lower  rate  of  curtailment  and  a larger  share  of  produc- 
tion than  other  countries  for  which,  from  other  standpoints,  the  means 
of  economic  progress  are  more  available  than  for  Persia. 

Neither  is  it  to  be  expected  that  the  Persian  Government  and  people 
will  continue  to  support  a programme  of  reduction  unless  Persia  is  ac- 
corded substantial  equality  of  opportunity  with  regard  to  the  world’s 
trade  in  medicinal  opium  and  unless  Persia  is  enabled  to  put  into  effect 
the  reasonable  measures  which  are  essential  for  fiscal  and  economic  re- 
adjustments. Among  these  reasonable  measures,  the  Commission  of  En- 
quiry has  particularly  noted  and  recommended  tariff  autonomy.  The 
Persian  Government  is  likewise  convinced  that  the  independence  and 
freedom  of  the  Persian  Government  regarding  the  establishment  of  legal 
Customs  tariffs  are  essential  for  the  protection  and  encouragement  of 
Persian  substitute  industries  and  the  promotion  of  exports.  In  fact,  the 
attainment  of  this  aim  is  the  absolutely  necessary  condition  of  success  of 
the  Persian  Government  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  which  the  League  of 
Nations  is  considering  for  curtailment  of  the  production  of  and  commerce 
in  opium.  The  Government  is  confident  that  there  will  be  a generous 
appreciation  by  other  Governments  of  this  important  aspect  of  the  situ- 
ation. It  will,  no  doubt,  be  also  taken  in  view  that  it  is  possible  for  other 
Governments  to  lend  assistance  by  reasonable  reduction  of  import  duties 
and  other  charges  and  burdens  which  hamper  Persian  exports. 

Parliamentary  Approval 

It  will  be  appreciated  that  any  restriction  of  opium  cultivation  or  ex- 
port will  require  Parliamentary  approval  and  that,  under  the  Persian 
constitution,  no  international  agreement  can  be  entered  into  by  the  Per- 
sian Government  except  after  formal  ratification  by  the  Majliss. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  considerations  and  after  a careful  study  of 
all  aspects  of  the  situation,  the  Government  has  prepared  the  following 
programme  which  it  will  submit  to  the  Majliss,  with  recommendation 
for  its  enactment  into  law. 

Programme  for  Opium  Legislation 

1.  Approval  of  recommendation  of  reduction  in  area  under  poppy 
cultivation  of  10  per  cent  per  annum  after  three  years  on  the  plan  pro- 
posed by  the  Commission  of  Enquiry. 

Note: — The  annual  reduction  to  continue  for  three  years,  after  which 
time  the  Persian  Government  will  reconsider  its  position,  taking  into  account 
the  effect  the  reduction  has  had  on  the  welfare  of  the  cultivator,  the  trade 
balance,  the  budget,  and  the  general  economic  condition  of  the  country,  and 
what  action  has  been  taken  by  other  producing  and  manufacturing  countries 
to  curtail  the  production  of  the  raw  material  and  the  manufacture  and  dis- 
tribution of  habit-forming  drugs. 


51 


2.  Acceptance  of  the  opium  import  certificate  system  with  an  annual 
reduction,  beginning  not  later  than  the  third  year  after  the  present,  of  10 
per  cent  of  the  quantity  annually  permitted  to  leave  the  country  without 
production  of  opium  import  certificates. 

Note  : — Subject  to  the  reservations  indicated  in  the  note  to  Paragraph  I. 

3.  An  exemption  from  land  taxes  for  a period  of  five  years  in  the 
case  of  areas  diverted  from  the  cultivation  of  the  poppy  to  that  of  sub- 
stitute crops. 

4.  Preference  in  the  granting  of  agricultural  loans  to  be  given  by  the 
State  Bank  of  Persia,  when  established,  to  cultivators  who  divert  part 
or  all  of  their  land  under  opium  cultivation  to  that  of  substitute  crops. 

5.  In  agreement  with  the  intention  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the 
recommendation  made  by  the  Commission,  the  Government  promises  to 
study  the  increase  of  export  Customs  duties  on  such  opium  as  is  exported 
without  certificate,  and  likewise  to  study  changing  the  existing  taxes  on 
opium  to  other  taxes  which  will  facilitate  and  expedite  the  decrease  of 
the  cultivation  of  and  commerce  in  opium. 

SUMMARY  OF  THE  VIEWS  OF  THE  PERSIAN  GOVERNMENT 

Having  examined  the  report  of  the  Commission  in  detail,  the  Persian 
Government  now  desires  to  summarise  its  views  in  connection  therewith 
and  to  state  the  measures  it  proposes  to  take  for  a reduction  in  opium 
cultivation. 

Substitution  of  Other  Crops  for  Opium 

It  is  believed  that  silk,  dried  fruits,  cotton,  nuts,  pharmaceutical  raw 
materials  and  flower  extracts  are  all  possible  crop  substitutes  and  meas- 
ures will  be  taken  to  encourage  their  production.  Measures  will  also  be 
taken  to  encourage  the  production  of  grains,  cereals  and  vegetables  to 
the  extent  necessary  to  meet  the  local  and  any  possible  export  demand. 
It  does  not,  however,  seem  probable  that  there  will  be  any  great  increase 
in  the  export  of  such  foodstuffs  until  road  and  railroad  construction 
bring  about  a much  lower  transport  cost  than  exists  at  present. 
Substitutes  Other  Than  Crops 

The  suggestions  for  the  establishment  of  the  cotton  and  sugar  manu- 
facturing industries  and  for  the  development  of  manufactures  in  Persia 
offer  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  trade  balance  the  greatest  possibility 
of  reducing  the  necessity  for  opium  exports. 

Protective  Tariff 

As  stated  by  the  Commission,  a protective  tariff  is  essential  to  the  de- 
velopment of  manufactures  in  Persia.  This  requires  that  the  present 
restrictions  on  Persia’s  tariff  autonomy  be  removed. 

Transport 

To  provide  the  roads  and  railroads  which  are  essential  for  the  intro- 
duction of  practically  all  substitute  crops  and  for  the  general  economic 
welfare  of  the  country,  an  expenditure  in  the  neighbourhood  of  100,000,- 

52 


000  tomans  will  be  required.  Of  this  sum,  all  but  20,000,000  tomans, 
required  for  road  construction  in  the  next  five  years,  has  already  been 
assured  by  the  assignment  of  specific  revenues. 

Water 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  foresee  the  expenditures  required  to  provide 
the  additional  water  which  will  be  needed  if  other  crops  are  substituted 
for  opium  as  a cash  crop  for  the  cultivator  and  as  an  item  of  export.  Un- 
questionably an  investment  of  many  millions  of  tomans  will  eventually 
be  required  for  the  completion  of  the  programme.  A single  project  has 
been  estimated  to  cost  four  million  tomans. 

Restrictive  Legislation 

More  than  half  of  the  Persian  provinces  are  directly  interested  in 
opium  cultivation.  Deputies  from  those  provinces  having  the  welfare  of 
their  constituents  in  view  cannot  be  expected  to  approve  any  restrictive 
regulation  which  does  not  afford  reasonable  assurance  that  undue  losses 
and  hardships  will  not  be  imposed  upon  the  opium-growers  and  upon 
those  engaged  in  the  many  allied  industries. 

Cost  of  Substitution 

In  this  connection,  it  is  necessary  to  invite  special  attention  to  the  re- 
quest made  by  the  Persian  Government  to  the  Commission  in  its  letter 
of  June  1st,  1926,  the  pertinent  paragraphs  of  which  are  quoted  below: 

“If,  after  having  had  the  benefit  of  the  advice  of  your  Commission,  means 
are  found  to  substitute  other  crops  for  opium  within  the  financial  capacity 
of  the  country,  the  adoption  of  such  means  can  be  assured.  If,  however, 
the  projects  for  crop  substitution  which  you  may  suggest  involve  an  ex- 
penditure for  irrigation,  transportation,  and  other  measures  in  excess  of  the 
financial  capacity  of  the  country,  such  part  of  the  accepted  programme  as 
may  be  put  into  effect  with  the  available  funds  will  be  undertaken.  The  carry- 
ing out  of  the  remainder  of  the  programme  must  necessarily  await  the  pro- 
curement of  additional  funds. 

“Even  a gradual  substitution  of  other  crops  for  opium  cultivation  will  in- 
volve expenditure  and  will  necessitate  budgetary  adjustments.  Therefore,  your 
Commission  will,  we  feel  confident,  agree  with  us  that,  before  embarking  on 
any  programme  of  crop  substitution,  there  should  be  a clear  conception,  not 
only  of  the  difficulties  to  be  met,  but  also  of  the  expenditure  involved.  Your 
attention  is  particularly  invited  to  this  matter,  and,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  Persian  Government  must  be  the  agency  for  carrying  out  your  proposals, 
you  are  requested,  so  far  as  may  be  possible,  to  state,  in  connection  with  each 
measure  proposed  by  you,  the  time  required  and  your  estimate  of  its  prob- 
able cost.” 

It  will  be  obvious  that  the  question  of  the  cost  of  substitution  is  one  of 
vital  importance  and  that  Persia  must  ascertain  the  cost  and  determine 
its  capacity  to  defray  it  before  agreeing  unreservedly  to  any  programme 
of  substitution. 

It  is  therefore  to  be  regretted  that  the  Commission  has  not  found  itself 
in  a position  to  accede  to  the  request  of  the  Government  and  to  state  the 

53 


probable  cost  of  the  measures  recommended  by  it  for  the  curtailment  of 
opium  production. 

Time  Required  for  Substitution 

The  Commission  has  not,  as  requested  by  the  Government,  stated  the 
time  which  in  its  estimation  would  be  required  for  the  successful  intro- 
duction of  each  of  the  substitutes  proposed.  The  important  crop  substi- 
tutes are  cotton,  silk  and  dried  fruits.  Cotton  will  require  at  least  five 
years  before  the  most  suitable  varieties  can  be  selected  and  introduced 
and  the  trade  properly  organised.  Silk  culture  will  require  at  least  six 
years  to  establish.  The  necessary  improvements  in  the  quality  and  the 
preparation  of  dried  or  otherwise  preserved  fruits  will  take  at  least 
five  years. 

The  road  construction  which  is  necessary  will  take  approximately  five 
years  after  the  funds  required  become  available. 

The  first  line  of  railroad  will  probably  take  not  less  than  six  years  to 
complete  and  the  construction  of  main  lines  north  to  south  and  east  to 
west  will  probably  require  in  the  neighborhood  of  fifteen  years  if  built 
from  current  revenues. 

The  Commission  has  envisaged  the  problem  of  substitution  in  its  larger 
aspects,  and  has  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  possible  to  undertake 
a programme  of  gradual  curtailment.  In  principle  this  is  accepted  as 
correct.  In  view,  however,  of  the  inability  of  the  Commission  to  indi- 
cate either  the  cost  or  the  time  required  for  the  introduction  of  substitute 
crops  and  for  the  development  of  new  industries,  it  would  not  be  possible 
for  the  Government  to  ask  the  Majliss  to  endorse  an  unqualified  pro- 
gramme of  reduction  pending  the  determination  of  these  vital  factors 
for  the  success  of  any  plan  for  the  curtailment  of  opium  production. 

ANNEX  V 

OPIUM  EXPORTS  OF  PERSIA 

Extract  from  Appendix  to  Memorandum  on  Persian  Opium,  1924. 


The  total  exports  of  opium  as  indicated  by  the  Persian  Customs  figures 
for  the  period  1292  (1913-14) — 1302  (1923-24)  are  given  below: 


Year : A.  H.  Solar 

A.  D. 

Batmans 

Pounds 

Value:  Krans* 

1292 

.1913-14 

118,541 

770,516 

37,714,494 

1293 

.1914-15 

134,641 

875,166 

41,446,256 

1294 

.1915-16 

122,922 

798,993 

41,732,238 

1295 

.1916-17 

118,109 

767,708 

41,597,275 

1296 

.1917-18 

115,305 

749,482 

44,783,249 

1297 

.1918-19 

56,201 

365,306 

28,595,885 

1298 

.1919-20 

49,903 

324,396 

24,166,116 

1299 

.1920-21 

56,193 

365,254 

22,178,390 

1300 

.1921-22 

39,338 

255,697 

15,449,663 

1301 

.1922-23 

101,638 

660,647 

40,908,128 

4302 

.1923-24 

106,282 

690,833 

60,219,715 

*1  kran  Is  the 

approximate 

equivalent  of  ten 

cents  In  American 

currency. 

54 


Distribution 


The  following  table  shows  the  distribution  of  the  opium  exports  during 
the  last  two  years  : 

It-il,  1301  (1922-23) 


Declared  Destination 

Batmans 

Pounds  Value:  Krans 

England  

44,637 

290,141 

18,099,420 

China  

25,650 

166,725 

11,005,000 

Russia  

22,048 

143,312 

8,372,440 

British  India  

5,672 

36,868 

2,092,000 

Japan  

3,279 

21,313 

1,180,000 

Mesopotamia  

176 

1,144 

88,000 

Egypt  

171 

1,111 

70,000 

Germany  

4 

26 

1,100 

France  

1.8 

.8 

168 

Totals  

101,637 

660,640 

40,908,128 

Tanguz-il  1302 

(1923-24) 

Russia  

69,427 

451,276 

40,994,810 

China  

21,106 

137,189 

11,604,700 

Japan  

5,479 

35,614 

3,067,600 

Arabia  

7,102 

46,163 

2,920,000 

England  

1,508 

9,802 

841,920 

United  States 

1,212 

7,878 

600,000 

British  India  

369 

2,398 

147,605 

Mesopotamia  

77 

300 

42,580 





3 

500 

Totals  

106,280 

690,823 

60,219,715 

To  the  1302  figures 

should  be  added  the  transhipments. 

which  will 

probably  be  credited  to  Persia  in  statistics  of  importing  country,  if  not 

entered  as  contraband : 

Batmans 

Pounds 

China  

1,000 

6,500  Value 

not  stated 

France  ... 

- 243 

1,579 

<4  II 

Hungary  

9,196 

59,774 

II  II 

Total  .... 

10,439 

67,853 

Total  exports  and  transhipments  ....116,719 


758,673 


56 


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